Date: 07-09-2018

Case Style:

Case Number: E070522

Judge: Ramirez, P.J.

Court: California Court of Appeals Fourth Appellate District Division Two on appeal from the Superior Court, Riverside County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Margaret Stevens, Emily Atherton and Robin Meadow

Defendant's Attorney: No appearance

Description: In this matter, we have reviewed the petition, its exhibits, and the letter response
filed by real parties in interest (hereafter real parties). We have determined that
resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that the
equities favor petitioners. We conclude that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first
instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36
Cal.3d 171, 178.)
I.
DISCUSSION
This case arises from employment-related contract disputes. In 2013, petitioners,
who are gastroenterologists, were recruited by real parties, GI Excellence, to work as
physicians in real parties’ gastroenterology service in Temecula, California. They each
entered into separate physician recruitment agreements and physician employment
agreements. The relationships did not last long. The two petitioners became dissatisfied
with their conditions of employment and compensation. They resigned in April and
May 2014. Real parties sued them in separate actions for breach of the employment and
recruitment contracts and other claims. Petitioners separately cross-complained for
breach of contract, fraud, violation of Labor Code section 970, and other cross-claims.
The cases were consolidated and transferred to the Southwest Justice Center in Murrieta
in December 2015. Given that the consolidated complaint and cross-complaint involve
the intricacies of gastroenterology medical and business practices, each side designated
gastroenterology expert witnesses to testify. Real parties designated their own members,
3
Milan S. Chakrabarty, M.D., and Indraneel Chakrabarty, M.D. Petitioners designated
Dr. Richard Corlin. The litigation has proceeded for about four years, with at least four
trial continuances over the past year. Most recently, trial was set to commence May 21,
2018.
On May 9, 2018, Dr. Corlin felt a sharp pain in his side while working on his
house. An ultrasound performed by his doctor revealed an apparent tumor in his kidney.
A urologist, Dr. Linehan, advised him to cancel his existing commitments and prepare for
surgery, which was scheduled initially for May 14. Subsequent tests on May 11 and 12
revealed that it was not a tumor but a ruptured hemorrhagic cyst affecting the kidney and
pancreas. This will require aspiration and re-evaluation. While the more invasive
planned surgery is no longer necessary, the urologist anticipates that treatment and a full
recovery will take about six weeks. During that time, she advised Dr. Corlin (and
informed the superior court) that he should not participate in trial as an expert witness or
be deposed. Real parties had not yet deposed Dr. Corlin—his deposition was set the
week prior to trial, the week in which his condition was discovered—so there was no
deposition testimony that could have been used at trial in place of his live expert
testimony. Petitioners filed their ex parte application for continuance of the May 21 trial
on May 14, 2018. Real parties filed an “opposition,” which in fact recognized the
likelihood that Dr. Corlin would be unavailable for a May 21 trial, and possibly for
longer than six weeks after treatment. Their main concern was the impact on patient
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scheduling unless a plan for a continuance, and the possible replacement of Dr. Corlin,
could be effected quickly.
The superior court denied the ex parte application for continuance on May 16.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition on May 17,
2018, requesting an immediate stay of trial while the petition was being considered. Also
on May 17, real parties filed an informal letter response. We issued an order on May 18,
2018, staying the May 21, 2018 trial and any proceeding requiring the participation of
Dr. Corlin pending determination of the petition. Given that real parties had provided an
informal response, we included a notice pursuant to Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners,
Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 178-179, that a peremptory writ may issue and giving the
parties until May 29, 2018, to file any opposition. None has been filed.
“A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of the absence of evidence can only be
made upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained, and
that due diligence has been used to procure it. The court may require the moving party,
where application is made on account of the absence of a material witness, to state upon
affidavit the evidence which he expects to obtain; and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it be considered as actually given on
the trial, or offered and overruled as improper, the trial must not be postponed.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 595.4; Jurado v. Toys “R” Us, Inc. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1615, 1617-1618
(Jurado).) The affidavit requirement is not jurisdictional and may be excused. (Jurado,
at p. 1618, citing Taylor v. Bell (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1008.) Here, petitioners
5
formally filed an ex parte application for a continuance of trial immediately after learning
of Dr. Corlin’s medical status, supported by declarations and the nature and importance
of his testimony to both their case in defense and case-in-chief on their cross-complaint.
Real parties filed an opposition, but only to suggest an alternative means to continue the
trial and ensure that Dr. Corlin, or a replacement, would be available to testify after a
reasonable continuance. They did not admit the content of Dr. Corlin’s expected
testimony. That satisfies Code of Civil Procedure section 595.4.
Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a request for
continuance of trial due to the absence of a properly called and subpoenaed witness.
(Jurado, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1619-1620 & fn. 3, citing in part, Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Taylor (1921) 52 Cal.App. 307 [it is a reversible abuse of discretion to
refuse a continuance requested on the ground the defendant was detained out of state by a
serious illness and was the only person familiar with the facts constituting his defense];
Betts Spring Co. v. Jardine Machinery Co. (1914) 23 Cal.App. 705 [it is a reversible
abuse of discretion to refuse a continuance requested on the ground the defendant, the
only witness able to prove his defense, was out of the country due to illness and there was
no intimation of bad faith or prejudice to the plaintiff by reason of a two-month delay].)
Here, the superior court expressed concern over the impact on patients being
treated by physician parties and witnesses and the scheduling difficulties attendant to a
continuance, as well as the age of the case and prior continuances. Nonetheless, the
superior court recognized that “a continuance is normally appropriate when an
6
unexpected illness renders an expert witness unavailable on the eve of trial[.]” The
superior court’s alternative would have trial commence as set on May 21, 2018, to be
interrupted virtually immediately by the trial judge allowing time for petitioners to seek,
retain, educate, and present a new expert witness, with the associated disruption in the
trial, patient support, and impact on sitting jurors. Notably, this option would create the
very disruption in patient support that real parties’ opposition sought to avoid. This is
borne out in real parties’ informal letter brief to this court, in which they state that the
plan the superior court’s order would put in place “causes the uncertainty that real parties
sought—and now seek—to avoid” and that the certainty in patient scheduling and
continuity of care would be undermined by the plan. While real parties are hardly happy
with the prospect of a continuance, they tacitly endorse a continuance “for at least six
weeks” beginning immediately, fearing that commencing trial only to pause it while a
replacement expert witness is sought would be the less desirable result.
Petitioners contend that their defense and cross-complaint would be rendered
ineffective absent Dr. Corlin’s testimony, and that it would be extremely difficult to find
a replacement expert under the circumstances. We recognize the superior court’s
assessment that it may not be that difficult to find a replacement, and its inherent power
to manage its docket. (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1146.) However, the
eve of trial impact on petitioners’ ability to present their case is an untenable burden and
a distraction during a high-tempo proceeding.
7
Accordingly, we have determined that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying petitioners’ request for a continuance, and that the petition should be granted.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, PROHIBITION,
OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;
REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE STAY


Against the urging of both sides, the trial court has refused
to continue an imminent trial despite an unforeseen and
unforeseeable medical emergency that has made it impossible for
petitioners’ key expert witness to testify for at least six weeks.
Just 12 days before trial, Dr. Richard F. Corlin, petitioners’
principal expert witness, learned that he must undergo
immediate surgery to address multiple potential medical issues,
including abnormalities in both kidneys and masses in both his
pancreas and prostate. Although these are apparently not
cancerous, they will require weekly procedures that will each
require a week’s recovery. His physician, a urological oncologist,
opined: “It is my very strong opinion that at the very least
testifying could impede and delay [Dr. Corlin’s] recovery from the
procedures he must undergo, and at the worst could actual[ly]
endanger his health and well-being.” (Appendix Exhibit
(App.) 30, p. 462, ¶4.) However, “[i]f the treatment plan goes as
anticipated, I expect Dr. Carlin will make a full recovery.” (App.
23, p. 340; see App. 30, p. 463, ¶ 7 [confirming earlier opinion,
following improved diagnosis].)
7
This business dispute among physicians involves issues
about the proper operation, safety, profitability, and other
aspects of gastroenterological medical practices. As a senior
practitioner of gastroenterology and a former president of the Los
Angeles, California, and American Medical Associations,
Dr. Corlin was going to bring his wealth of experience and
expertise in these areas to petitioners’ case, both in their defense
against claims against them and in the presentation of their own
claims. The absence of his testimony will effectively gut
petitioners’ case.
Despite being advised of Dr. Corlin’s medical problem when
it arose a week ago, the trial court refused to hold a conference
call with the parties’ counsel, requiring an ex parte application
that could not be heard until four days later; then continued the
ex parte hearing; and then, just yesterday, denied a continuance.
Because the prejudice of this ruling is as obvious as it is extreme,
and because petitioners bear absolutely no responsibility for the
situation, the trial court indisputably abused its discretion.
This Court should order an immediate stay of the trial and
direct the trial court (a) to continue the trial for at least six
8
weeks, and further if Dr. Corlin’s medical condition requires it,
and (b) to stay all trial court proceedings that involve Dr. Corlin.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying
a continuance necessitated by an unforeseeable but urgent
medical problem that rendered an indispensable expert
unavailable and that surfaced only days before trial?
9
PETITION
Petitioners Manmeet S. Padda, M.D., and Haritha R.
Chelimilla, M.D., allege:
A. The Parties
1. Petitioners are board-certified gastroenterologists
who moved to California to become employed by real party in
interest GI Excellence, Inc. (GIE). Dr. Padda gave up a lucrative
position at a medical group in Las Vegas, Nevada. Dr. Chelimilla
had completed her fellowship in New York, and passed up other
employment opportunities to work for GIE. They are defendants
and cross-complainants in the underlying consolidated actions.
2. Real parties in interest Milan S. Chakrabarty, M.D.,
and Indraneel Chakrabarty, M.D., are board-certified
gastroenterologists who own GIE, a medical practice based in
Hemet, California (collectively GIE Parties). The GIE Parties are
plaintiffs and cross-defendants in the underlying consolidated
actions.
3. Respondent Riverside County Superior Court is the
court exercising jurisdiction over this action.
10
B. Background
4. In 2013, recruited separately by a placement
company retained by GIE, petitioners accepted employment with
GIE. They both moved to Temecula, California—Dr. Padda from
Las Vegas, Nevada, and Dr. Chelimilla from Bronx, New York.
In addition to entering into written employment agreements,
together with GIE they each entered into a written “physician
recruitment agreement” with a hospital.
5. The relationships did not work out. Petitioners
began working for GIE and began seeing patients at the hospitals
in September 2013. But they soon became aware that GIE’s
representations about the conditions of their work and about
their compensation were not borne out. After unsuccessful efforts
to resolve the issues, both resigned, Dr. Padda in April 2014 and
Dr. Chelimilla in May 2014.
11
C. The Litigation And The Parties’ Need
For Experts.
1. The parties’ claims.
6. GIE sued petitioners in separate actions for breach of
the employment and recruitment agreements. (App. 1, 3.)1
Petitioners cross-complained for fraud, violation of Labor Code
section 970 (false representations that induce an employee to
change residence) and breach of contract. (App. 4, 5.) Loma
Linda sued GIE and Dr. Padda for breach of the recruitment
agreement, but that part of the litigation has been resolved.
7. Although this may sound like a straightforward
employment case, it is hardly that. For one thing, here the
employer, GIE, seeks damages for its employees’ allegedly
wrongful resignation, and it therefore intends to present a lostprofits
claim. (App. 1, p. 16, ¶12, pp.18-19, ¶17; 3, p. 71, ¶10,
p. 72, ¶13; 24, p. 410, ¶3.B.) In addition, GIE seeks damages for
1 The exhibits in the accompanying appendix are accurate copies
of documents filed with the trial court or, in the case of reporter’s
transcripts, accurately report the proceedings they describe. All
are incorporated into this petition by reference.
12
the alleged breach of the physician recruitment agreement
occasioned by petitioners’ resignations. (Id.) For their part,
petitioners seek the income they would have earned had they not
been induced to leave their former situations—essentially their
own lost profits. (App. 4, p. 132, ¶63; 5, p. 195, ¶65; 23, p. 353,
¶4.a.) These kinds of damages issues involve more than numbercrunching—
they require testimony about how gastroenterology
practices operate and how they generate income.
8. And there are other issues that also require expert
testimony from a gastroenterologist concerning the proper
management of a gastroenterological practice. This is because
one of the reasons petitioners resigned was that they thought the
practice was mismanaged (both generally and in how GIE
required them to spend their time) and that it was unsafe
because of inadequate hygiene. Beyond this, one of the reasons
they believe that they were defrauded into accepting employment
with GI Excellence was that the misrepresentations concerned
the conditions of their employment, the expected growth of the
practice, and their expected opportunities to become partners in
a lucrative operation.
13
9. Consistent with these needs, both sides designated
experts on issues involving the operation of a gastroenterology
practice. The GIE Parties designated themselves—Drs. Milan
and Indraneel Chakrabarty. (App. 24, pp. 408, 410-412.)
Petitioners designated Dr. Corlin.
2. Petitioners’ designated expert, Dr.
Richard Corlin.
10. Dr. Corlin is an exceptionally-qualified witness in all
of these areas. His post-fellowship career dates back to 1972,
when he became the Director of UCLA Medical Center’s
Gastroenterology Endoscopy Unit, and he has been in private
practice since 1975. (App. 23, pp. 355-356.) In addition to
practicing, he has been a member and often a leader of multiple
professional organizations focusing on gastroenterology, as well
as the elected president of the Los Angeles Medical Association,
the California Medical Association and the American Medical
Association. (App. 23, pp. 355-357.) He therefore has a breadth
of knowledge and experience relevant to this case that few other
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witnesses can match. For these reasons, in August 2017
petitioners designated him as an expert as follows:
Dr. Corlin is an expert in the areas of medical
practice management and hospital management
including but not limited to relationships and
agreements between hospitals and medical practices
and physicians, physician recruitment and practice
development, medical billing and payments for
services rendered, financial and physical conditions
of physician’s services and employment, and related
subjects. Dr. Corlin will testify on some or all of
these areas with respect to the claims made by
Defendants [petitioners] as well as comment and
critique on any opposing expert reports, opinions
and/or testimony in these and related areas.
(App. 23, p. 352, ¶3(a); see also p. 345 [petitioners’ counsel states:
“Dr. Corlin’s expert testimony is essential to Defendants’ Case-In-
Chief and his background and experience make[] him uniquely
qualified to render opinions regarding the circumstances of this
dispute”].)
15
3. Procedural history.
11. The cases were consolidated and transferred to the
Southwest Justice Center in Murrieta in December 2015 (App. 8)
and were ultimately assigned to Hon. Raquel A. Marquez (App.
10). In January 2017, the trial court scheduled trial for May 19,
2017 (App. 11), but by stipulation it was continued to September
29, 2017 (App. 13).
12. On September 29, 2017, by ex parte application, the
GIE Parties sought and received a further continuance because of
“the unexpected illness and unavailability of their expert witness,
Kelly Allen”; they said his testimony was “critical to the issue of
damages on the claims filed by GI Excellence.” (App. 14, p. 265,
line 23, p. 266, line 6.) Mr. Allen’s physician described
“a persistent respiratory infection” and stated that “I highly
recommend that you give yourself proper minimum rest from
work and any other related activities for a period not less than
three to four weeks.” (App. 14, p. 295.) Petitioners did not
oppose the application. In granting a three-week continuance,
the trial court observed, “I can accommodate. That’s not
a problem. . . . The Court will work with counsel to ensure that
16
he’ll be able to testify just fine.” (App. 17, p. 300.) The court
granted the ex parte motion, continuing the trial to October 17,
2017. (App. 15, 16.) It never suggested that Mr. Allen should
interrupt his recovery to testify by videoconference, as it did here
for Dr. Corlin. (See ¶¶17, 23, post.)
13. The trial was continued twice more, to February 23,
2018 (App. 20) and then to May 21, 2018 (App. 22). The case was
assigned for trial to Judge Pro Tem John P. Farrell. (App. 22.)
D. Twelve Days Before Trial, Dr. Corlin’s
Physician Finds “Abnormalities” In His
Kidneys And “Masses” In His Pancreas And
Prostate, And She Orders Immediate
Surgery.
14. In Dr. Corlin’s words: “On May 9, 2018, I was doing
some remodeling work on my house and I leaned over at an odd
angle in order to perform some of the work. After I did this, I felt
a sharp pain in my side, so I went to the doctor to be examined,
thinking it was some kind of strain or other issue related to the
awkward movement. However, when an ultrasound was
17
performed, it was discovered that I had a large tumor in my
kidney. I was told that I would need to meet with a surgeon
immediately in order to schedule surgery to have the tumor
removed.” (App. 23, p. 342 ¶5.) He declares that the surgery is
“currently [i.e., as of May 11, 2018] scheduled for Monday,
May 14, 2018.” (App. 23, pp. 342-343, ¶6 [declaration included in
ex parte papers, but not yet signed]; see ¶ App. 24, pp. 405-406
[declaration updated and signed].)
15. In the words of Dr. Corlin’s physician, urological
oncologist Jennifer A. Linehan, M.D.: “[Dr. Corlin’s] ultrasound
[on Thursday, May 10, 2018] revealed multiple abnormalities of
both his right and left kidney. . . . During his work up today
[Friday May 11, 2018] he was found to have a mass in the
pancreas as well as a mass in the prostate. . . . Based on what
I know now [May 11], it is my medical opinion that Dr. Corlin
must focus on his health and well-being for approximately six
weeks following surgery. I have instructed Dr. Corlin that he
should not engage in any business-related or stress-inducing
activities during those six weeks.” (App. 23, pp. 340-341, ¶¶5,7.)
18
16. By Sunday, May 13, 2018, the news was less grim,
but Dr. Corlin’s condition still precluded his immediate
involvement in discovery and trial. He declared: “Further preoperative
evaluation and scans were performed on Friday,
May 11, 2018 and Saturday, May 12, 2018, which revealed that
this lesion was a large hemorrhagic cyst that had ruptured,
causing significant bleeding into several tissues. There are still
issues that will need to be promptly dealt with including an
aspiration of a pancreatic cyst, and re-evaluation of the kidney
lesion. This is planned for some time during the week of May 14,
2018, and because of the urgent occurrence of these findings the
exact schedule is not known today.” (App. 24, p. 406, ¶7.)
19
E. Despite The Parties’ Concurrence That
Some Kind Of Continuance Is Necessary,
The Trial Court Refuses To Grant Any
Continuance.
1. Petitioners immediately notify the
court and opposing counsel and move
ex parte to continue the trial.
17. Dr. Corlin called petitioners’ counsel, Margaret
P. Stevens, at about 9:15 am on May 10, 2018, and described his
situation. (App. 23, p. 344.) She immediately contacted the trial
court, ultimately speaking to the courtroom assistant. (Ibid.)
Ms. Stevens explained the problem and requested a conference
call with the court and opposing counsel. After placing
Ms. Stevens on hold, the courtroom assistant came back on the
line, said that “it will be difficult to continue the trial,” and
suggested that Dr. Corlin’s deposition testimony could be used at
trial or he could “Skype” in his testimony. (Ibid.) She further
said that the trial could not be continued because “so many
resources have already been dedicated for this trial,” and she
20
denied Ms. Stevens’ request for a conference call with the court
and opposing counsel to discuss the unforeseen situation and
what to do about it.
18. It was impossible to use deposition testimony at trial
because Dr. Corlin had not yet been deposed—his deposition was
scheduled for May 15, 2018. And it was impossible to predict
whether he would even be available for, or even physically
capable of, presenting testimony by videoconference at the
upcoming trial—to say nothing of his physician’s instruction
“that he should not engage in any business-related or stressinducing
activities during [the next] six weeks.” (App. 23,
pp. 340-341.)
19. Ms. Stevens immediately began preparing an
ex parte application for a continuance—which, because the trial
court was to be dark on Friday, May 11, she could not present
until Monday, May 14. App. 23, p. 345.) She did, however, email
a copy to the court and opposing counsel late Friday, May 11, as
soon as she received a signed declaration from Dr. Corlin’s
physician, Dr. Linehan. (App. 24, p. 402.) Ms. Stevens’
supporting declaration described Dr. Corlin’s qualifications as
21
outlined above and explained why his absence would destroy
petitioners’ case:
[Dr. Corlin] and I have been discussing the case for
many months, and he was prepared to be deposed
next week [i.e., the week of May 14]. I have not
retained any other experts to testify on the multiple
subjects that are within Dr. Corlin’s expertise. Even
assuming there is someone else who is comparably
qualified, there is no possibility that I could find that
person and bring him or her sufficiently up to speed
in time to testify at the presently-scheduled trial,
even if defendants were prepared to forgo taking his
deposition before he testified. In a word, the absence
of Dr. Corlin will destroy my clients’ ability to present
their case.”
(App. 23, pp. 345-346, italics added.)
22
2. Instead of ruling on petitioners’
motion, the trial court puts the matter
over to Thursday, May 17—four days
before trial.
20. Petitioners presented their ex parte application on
Monday morning, May 14, 2018. (App. 23-25.) The trial court
declined to rule.
21. The court’s unsupported and unwarranted
concern about medical patient scheduling. The court
repeatedly expressed concern about the parties’ patients—third
parties, not involved in the case—whose appointments would
have to be rescheduled if the trial were moved. (App. 25, pp. 341-
343.) The court suggested several times that an appropriate
solution would be to continue the trial for two weeks and plan on
having Dr. Corlin testify at the end. (App. 25, p. 426, 430, 434,
436.) Although the court acknowledged the importance of Dr.
Corlin’s health situation, “[it is] no less important than all of the
other individuals in the community who also have medical
issues.” (App. 25, p. 343.) “We move one case for a couple of
23
weeks, that means now we have patients who are all seeing all of
these doctors who get inconvenienced as well.” (App. 25, 433.)
22. In this, the court focused on a supposed problem as to
which there was no evidence and that neither side has ever
raised or endorsed in connection with any of the prior
continuances or now. The GIE Parties’ concern about medical
patients was explicitly about the uncertainties that would flow
from the denial of a continuance or the two-week continuance
that the court suggested. As their counsel put it: “And [the GIE
Parties], as much as they do not want a continuance, having
a segmented proceeding or having question marks on what is
going to happen, creates a far worse scenario because it
impacts—it impacts patients worse when there’s a lack of
certainty.” (App. 25, p. 435; see also App. 28, 449, fn. 1 [GIE
Parties’ memorandum filed after the hearing: “The impact of
uncertain or indefinite trial days for weeks will affect well over
a hundred patients. The importance of scheduling trial on dates
certain cannot be overstated,” italics added].)
23. The court’s misplaced concerns about whether
Dr. Corlin’s physician understood Skype. The court also
24
expressed a strong interest in speaking to Dr. Linehan—
“[p]erhaps she’s not aware that we can do the deposition by
Skype . . . .” (App. 25, p. 434; see App. 25, p. 437 [“I just need to
speak to her to insure she knows the various types of—that we
can do a phone call, there can be a Skype type of deposition, that
he could be in here for two hours, we can provide breaks”]; see
¶ 28, post [Dr. Linehan knows about Skype but still recommends
against Dr. Corlin’s testifying].)
24. The court put the matter over to May 17, 2018, at
10:00 am, stating that it would make itself available any time
that day to have a reported conversation on CourtCall with Dr.
Linehan. (App. 25, p. 441.)
3. Both sides’ further filings demonstrate
the need for a continuance.
25. On May 15, 2018, both sides submitted further filings
addressing the court’s questions from the May 14 hearing. (App.
28, 29, 30.)
26. The GIE Parties, albeit reluctantly, supported
a continuance in the interest of achieving certainty (despite
25
titling their filing “opposition”): “We plead with the Court for
a result that avoids condemning hundreds of patients to
scheduling limbo, such as a trailing arrangement or segmented
trial with a hiatus of two or more weeks, especially where Dr.
Corlin’s return after six weeks is far from assured.” (App. 28,
p. 449.) But, they added, a continuance should be conditioned
“upon [petitioners’] engagement of another expert or experts in
the areas of Dr. Corlin’s expertise, whom [petitioners] would be
required to use if Dr. Corlin is unable to proceed.” (App. 28,
pp. 449-450.)
27. Petitioners submitted a further declaration from
Dr. Linehan—the only person in the proceeding with any
professional knowledge about Dr. Corlin’s condition, surgical
needs and prognosis:
• Dr. Linehan described the expected procedures and
explained that “[i]t usually takes a patient a full week to
feel himself/herself again.” (App. 30, p. 463, ¶6.)
• She stated that she could not participate in a CourtCall
hearing on Thursday, May 17, 2018, because of her
26
surgery schedule, but that she could be available on
Wednesday, May 16. (App. 30, p. 462, ¶3.)
• She reaffirmed her instructions to Dr. Corlin and her
prognosis of a full recovery in six weeks. (App. 30,
p. 462, ¶4, p. 462, ¶7.)
28. Dr. Linehan also confirmed that she is fully aware of
the possibility of testifying by video, and stated that this
approach would not alleviate her medical concerns:
I am quite familiar with remote communications
using videoconferencing techniques like Skype,
FaceTime and others, and I appreciate that it would
be less difficult than testifying in court. But I am
also very aware that giving testimony is generally
a highly stressful activity. My concern about Dr.
Corlin’s testifying is not just the difficulty of having
to travel to Murrieta and being present in court but
also the stress it will necessarily induce no matter
where he is, even in an armchair in his living room.
It is my very strong opinion that at the very least
testifying could impede and delay his recovery from
the procedures he must undergo, and at the worst
could actual[ly] endanger his health and well-being.
27
(App. 30, p. 462, italics added.)
4. The trial court denies a continuance.
29. The Thursday hearing never occurred, and the Court
apparently decided not to try to reach Dr. Linehan on
Wednesday, May 16, 2018 (when Dr. Linehan had said she could
be available).
30. Instead, the court denied the motion for continuance
outright, by way of an order emailed to counsel at 1:23 pm on
Wednesday, May 16, 2018. (App. 31.)
31. Among other things, the order again expresses the
concern, still unsupported by any evidence, about “disrupting the
multiple medical practices—and the care of their patients—
involved. A trial continuance will result in great inconvenience
and, perhaps[,] even endangerment of health and well-being for
these patients as well.” (App. 31, p. 468.) Beyond the absence of
any evidentiary support for this statement, it contradicts the GIE
Parties’ statement that the problem was not a continuance, but
rather the uncertainty that would result from the denial of
a continuance. (See ¶¶ 22, 26, ante.)
28
32. The Order also appears to assume that Dr. Corlin
probably will not be able to testify via Skype and that petitioners
will need to find one or more other experts:
“If Dr. Corlin is unable to testify by Skype, as
anticipated by his physician, a less burdensome
solution would be to allow defendants to augment
their expert witness list to designate an expert
witness(es) to replace Dr. Corlin due to his
unavailability. The trial judge shall set a deadline
for the augmentation of the expert witness list, after
consideration of the trial schedule and the time
needed by defendants to locate and prepare
a replacement expert(s).”
(App. 31, p. 468.)
33. Petitioners know they must retain backup experts.
But the order does not suggest how petitioners’ counsel will be
able to locate and educate possibly multiple experts, who will
have to learn the case from scratch, while counsel is in the middle
of a trial that will start in just two court days.
34. The Order also does not address the very real
possibility that petitioners will have to try much of the case
without knowing what their experts will say. (App. 29, p. 458,
29
¶4.b.) [Petitioners’ counsel: “In the unlikely but certainly
possible event that Dr. Corlin ends up being unable to serve as
Defendants’ expert within the time frame the Court projects,
I will be faced with having to find a new expert to replace Dr.
Corlin who may have slightly different opinions. This creates the
risk that my opening statement and how I frame the defenses
and claims of my clients may not accurately reflect the opinions
of the new expert”].)
F. Writ Relief Is Appropriate And Necessary;
There Is No Adequate Remedy By Appeal.
35. These points are indisputable:
• In order to defend against the complaints and prove
their cross-complaints, petitioners must have an expert
witness who can testify about multiple aspects of
a gastroenterology practice.
• Dr. Corlin has that expertise, but cannot be available—
and his unavailability could not have been known before
May 10, 2018.
30
• With trial just two court days away, there is no
possibility of both locating substitute expert(s) and
sufficiently educating them about the evidence and
complexities of this case, much less having the GIE
Parties depose him, before the start of trial.
• The absence of expert testimony will irreparably impair
petitioners’ ability to present their case.
• While petitioners may well be able to locate one or more
substitute experts, the time frame for doing so cannot be
known, among other reasons because without
a continuance, they will have to so in the middle of trial.
• If Petitioners are required to enlist substitute experts,
the denial of a continuance means that petitioners must
try at least the first part of the case without knowing
their substitute experts’ opinions.
• Dr. Corlin’s physician—the only person qualified to
opine on the subject—states that she expects a full
recovery in six weeks.
31
36. It is difficult to imagine a more compelling showing of
cause, apart from the death or unavoidable absence of a party’s
counsel. (See Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 1242, 1244, 1246 [“If plaintiff’s counsel’s serious
physical illness and its debilitating effects culminating in death
during the final stages of litigation are not good cause for
continuing a trial and reopening of discovery, there is no such
thing as good cause”; court finds “abuse of discretion as a matter
of law”].) It is equally difficult to imagine a clearer abuse of
discretion than denying a continuance under the present
circumstances. (Ibid.)
37. It should hardly be necessary to observe that, without
a continuance, there is a high risk of a mistrial and that any
resulting judgment will likely be so deeply flawed that an appeal
will be inevitable, and reversal almost certain. The substantial
time, expense and court resources devoted to the premature trial
will have been wasted, and the parties will suffer a delay of at
least several more years. That does not remotely qualify as an
adequate remedy by appeal.
32
38. The trial court’s denial of a continuance means that
only writ relief can prevent this unjust result.
G. The Court Should Stay The Trial Pending
Its Decision On This Petition.
39. Trial is just two court days away—Monday, May 21.
The entire purpose of this writ petition is to continue the trial.
Allowing trial to start before this Court decides whether it must
be continued would entail substantial unnecessary effort and
expense by both the parties and the trial court, and would serve
no useful purpose.
40. The remaining pretrial activities, which must occur
in any event—finalizing jury instructions, completing expert
depositions, and the like—need not be stayed.
41. Petitioners were unable to request a temporary stay
from the trial court because the trial court cancelled the
Thursday, May 17 hearing. But such a request would
unquestionably have been futile in any case—the trial court
rejected its own suggestion of a two-week continuance.
33
H. This Petition Is Timely—It Could Not Have
Been Filed Earlier.
42. Petitioners’ counsel acted diligently upon learning of
Dr. Corlin’s medical emergency. She immediately called the trial
court, explained the situation to the courtroom assistant and
requested a conference with the court and opposing counsel; the
request was refused. Because the court was dark the following
day (Friday, May 11), she scheduled her ex parte continuance
application for the next available day, Monday, May 14—the
second court day after she spoke to Dr. Corlin.
43. Instead of granting or denying a continuance, the
trial court put the matter over to Thursday, May 17, 2018—just
two court days before the trial. Her principal reason, apart from
allowing the GIE Parties’ counsel to file papers, appears to have
been that she wanted to question Dr. Linehan regarding her
knowledge of Skype and her opinions about Dr. Corlin’s condition
and expected recovery period. But then instead of following up,
the court cancelled the hearing and denied the continuance by an
emailed order on Wednesday, May 16.
34
44. While theoretically this petition could have been filed
on the basis of the trial court’s failure to rule on May 14, 2018—
given petitioners’ view that a continuance was required as
a matter of law—the trial court’s desire to consider the matter
further, and its stated inclination to provide at least a brief
continuance, would have rendered such a petition premature.
Petitioners accordingly prepared to file this petition as soon as
possible after the expected ruling on May 17.
45. The unexpected earlier denial of a continuance
allowed petitioners to complete this petition earlier than
expected, but given that the ruling was not issued until the
afternoon, it was not possible to personally serve the petition, as
this Court’s local rules require, in time to file it the same day.
(Local Rules, rule 1(a).)
46. Accordingly, this petition has been filed at the
earliest possible time.
35
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray that this Court:
1. Stay the trial pending the Court’s determination of
this petition;
2. (a) Issue a peremptory writ of mandate or other
appropriate relief directing respondent court (a) to continue the
trial for at least six weeks, and further if Dr. Corlin’s medical
condition requires it, and (b) to stay all trial court proceedings
that involve Dr. Corlin; or, in the alternative,
(b) Issue an alternative writ of mandate or other
appropriate relief, directing respondent court to show cause why
a peremptory writ of mandate should not issue as described
above, and then issue such a peremptory writ;
36
3. Award Petitioners their costs in this proceeding; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be proper.
May 17, 2018 STEVENS LAW, P.C.
Margaret P. Stevens
Emily J. Atherton
GREINES, MARTIN, STEIN &
RICHLAND, LLP
Robin Meadow
By /s/ Robin Meadow
Robin Meadow
Attorneys for Petitioners
MANMEET S. PADDA, M.D., and
HARITHA R. CHELIMILLA, M.D.
37
VERIFICATION
Margaret P. Stevens declares:
I am licensed to practice law in California. I am the
principal of Stevens Law, P.C., attorneys of record for petitioners.
I have reviewed and am familiar with the records and files that
are the basis of this petition. I make this verification instead of
my clients because I am more familiar with the particular facts,
i.e., the state of the record and the litigation and in particular Dr.
Corlin’s expected role in the case and his current medical
situation, than are my clients. I certify that the petition’s
allegations are true and correct.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct and that this verification is executed on May 17,
2018, at Los Angeles, California.
/s/ Margaret P. Stevens
Margaret P. Stevens
38
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Although we recognize that the trial court has broad
discretion in ruling on a motion for a continuance, “the refusal of
a continuance which has the practical effect of denying the
applicant a fair hearing is reversible error.” (Oliveros v. County
of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395, citations and
internal quotation marks omitted.)
This exactly describes the present ruling.
We appreciate that the trial court believed that the
continuance request presented it with a difficult problem and
that it “has done everything within its power in this case to
accommodate and will continue doing so.” (App. 25, p. 441.) But
the fact remains that the court’s ruling may well effectively
preclude petitioners from presenting any expert testimony on
core issues in the case. Their expected expert witness is
unavailable through no fault of theirs or his, and there is no time
to make alternative arrangements before trial begins just two
court days from now. These circumstances have “the practical
effect of denying [petitioners] a fair hearing.” (Ibid.)
39
All this, apparently in order to address a non-existent
problem of patient scheduling—despite the absence of any
evidence on the point, and in the face of the GIE Parties’ strong
contrary statements. From their perspective, the denial of
a continuance under these circumstances would “create[] a far
worse scenario because it impacts—it impacts patients worse
when there’s a lack of certainty.” (App. 25, p. 435.)
For well over a century, courts have recognized that a trial
court abuses its discretion when it denies a continuance required
by the unavoidable, good-faith and fault-free absence of a key
witness or party. For example, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Taylor (1921) 52 Cal.App. 307, the trial court denied
a continuance despite a showing that the defendant, who was ill
and out of state, “was the only person familiar with the facts
constituting the defense, and the only person who knew the
whereabouts of any of the witnesses that he desired to be called
on his behalf.” (Id. at p. 308 citing numerous authorities.) The
Court of Appeal reversed, observing that “[i]t is quite plain from
the facts recited in said affidavit that defendants could not have a
fair trial in the absence of said Taylor, and therefore, legally
40
speaking, the denial of the motion prejudiced their substantial
rights.” (Id. at p. 311.) While the present case is not quite so
extreme, Dr. Corlin’s absence will leave an evidentiary hole in
petitioners’ case that, within the current trial schedule,
petitioners are no better able to fill than was Mr. Taylor.
To be sure, the unexpected absence of an expert does not
always require a continuance. For example, the appellate court
found no abuse of discretion in the denial of a continuance where
an expert suffered a stroke shortly before trial, but where “[t]he
expert’s deposition testimony was available for use at trial,
a former party witness testified competently as to surety
practices, and the court forbade [the plaintiff] from commenting
to the jury about the absence of a nonparty surety expert
witness.” (Arntz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 464, 488-489.)
The present case presents no such benign situation.
Dr. Corlin has not been deposed (his deposition was scheduled for
May 15, 2018), and there is no back-up witness because there was
no reason to believe he would not testify. And this is not just a
number-crunching damages expert: He has unique knowledge
41
and experience about the medical practice issues that lie at the
core of both sides’ claims against one another. This kind of
expert is not fungible—one can’t just call up another accounting
firm and ask it to take over. And it is not reasonable to expect
trial counsel to locate, educate and prepare a new expert—
possible multiple experts—while in the middle of trial.
Although we believe the present case is sufficiently extreme
that no further analysis should be necessary, there is some law
that identifies the factors courts should consider under
circumstances like those here—and they all indisputably point
toward requiring a continuance.
In People v. Dunn (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1086, the Court
of Appeal considered a criminal defendant’s contention that the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
a mistrial, which was based on the unexpected unavailability of
one of his experts. (Id. at pp. 1092-1094.) Observing that it had
found no directly applicable California law, the court analogized
the case before it to “a motion for new trial based on the absence
of testimony from a witness who was expected to testify at trial,”
and identified these factors: “(1) the defendant’s diligence in
42
securing the attendance of the witness; (2) the defendant’s use of
available alternative means to obtain the desired evidence;
(3) the defendant’s fault for the witness’s nonappearance; and
(4) the nature of the testimony expected from the witness and its
probable effect on the outcome of the trial.” (Id. at p. 1095.) The
court found that the defendant had not satisfied any of these
criteria, and that the trial court therefore had not abused its
discretion—noting, as to the fourth factor, “most importantly,
[the expert’s] expected testimony would not have changed the
result of the trial.” (Id. at p. 1096.)
The present case is just the opposite:
1. Petitioners were diligent: Dr. Corlin was fully
prepared to testify, and his deposition was just days
away when his medical problems surfaced.
2. There are no reasonable alternative means of
providing Dr. Corlin’s testimony or its equivalent
within the current trial schedule, at least not until
well into the trial.
3. Petitioners bear no responsibility whatever for
Dr. Corlin’s unavailability.
43
4. Petitioners have demonstrated that Dr. Corlin’s
testimony is indispensable both to their defense
against the GIE Parties’ case and to their own
affirmative case, so it is highly probable that its
absence will “change[] the result of the trial.” (People
v. Dunn, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1096.)
Petitioners appreciate that trial courts must balance
expedition against parties’ individual needs, and that here the
trial court has gone to great lengths to accommodate a case that
it regards as unusually complex and demanding of its resources.
But under the present facts, the balance tips only one way. As
one court observed in reversing a judgment because of the trial
court’s refusal to continue a trial in the absence of the
defendant’s lead attorney: “While it is true that a trial judge
must have control of the courtroom and its calendar and must
have discretion to deny a request for a continuance when there is
no good cause for granting one, it is equally true that, absent
[a lack of diligence or other abusive] circumstances which are not
present in this case, a request for a continuance supported by
a showing of good cause usually ought to be granted.” (Oliveros v.
44
County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1396,
original brackets, internal quotation marks and citations omitted,
italics added.)
That exactly describes the present case: Indisputable good
cause, indisputable absence of fault, indisputable diligence and
indisputable prejudice from the denial of a continuance.
45
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s understandable frustration with the
complex and unusual procedural posture of this case appears to
have distracted it from its primary mission: to ensure fair
process for all parties. Here, ensuring fair process for all parties
requires granting a continuance in order to prevent the
destruction of petitioners’ case.
The Court should grant the petition and direct the trial
court to grant a continuance as prayed in the petition.
Dated: May 17, 2018
Respectfully submitted,
STEVENS LAW, P.C.
Margaret P. Stevens
Emily J. Atherton
GREINES, MARTIN, STEIN
& RICHLAND, LLP
Robin Meadow
By /s/ Robin Meadow
Robin Meadow
Attorneys for Petitioners
MANMEET S. PADDA, M.D., and
HARITHA R. CHELIMILLA, M.D.
46
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1),
(c)(4), I certify that this PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE,
PROHIBITION OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES contains
6,271 words, not including the tables of contents and authorities,
the caption page, signature blocks, or this Certification page.
Date: May 17, 2018 /s/ Robin Meadow
Robin Meadow
47
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of
California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within
action; my business address is 5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th
Floor, Los Angeles, California 90036.
On May 17, 2018, I served the foregoing document
described as: PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, PROHIBITION,
OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES; REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE STAY on the
parties in this action by serving:
Hon. Raquel A. Marquez, Department: S303
RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT
Southwest Justice Center
30755-D Auld Road
Murrieta, CA 92563
Tel: (951) 704-7525
Email: Vivian.Arnold@riverside.courts.ca.gov
__________________
J. Craig Johnson
JOHNSON LAW FIRM APC
41593 Winchester Road, Suite 200
Post Office Box 891209
Temecula, California 92589
Tel: (951) 353-8000
Email: cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com
Attorney for Real Parties in Interest: GI Excellence, Inc.;
Milan S. Chakrabarty, M.D.
and Indraneel Chakrabarty, M.D.
By Electronic Transmission, pursuant to the
attached agreements between the parties: I caused the
above-named document to be transmitted via electronic
48
transmission to the offices of the addressee(s) at the Email
address so indicated above.
Executed on May 17, 2018 Los Angeles, California.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
/s/ Leslie Y. Barela
Leslie Y. Barela
From: Margaret Stevens
To: Leslie Barela; Robin Meadow
Subject: FW: GI Excellence v Padda
Date: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 3:46:07 PM
From: Arnold, Vivian [mailto:Vivian.Arnold@riverside.courts.ca.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 3:44 PM
To: Margaret Stevens
Cc: cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com; 'Mitzi Smith' ; Roselle Bloodsaw
; Emily Atherton
Subject: RE: GI Excellence v Padda
Hello Ms. Stevens,
The Court will accept the service copy of the writ by email. You may email me at this email address
for service.
Thank you,
Vivian Arnold
Courtroom assistant
Southwest Justice Center
951-704-7615
From: Margaret Stevens
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 2:26 PM
To: Arnold, Vivian
Cc: cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com; 'Mitzi Smith' ; Roselle Bloodsaw
; Emily Atherton
Subject: RE: GI Excellence v Padda
Dear Ms. Arnold,
Thank you for the reminder and update.
Defendants will be filing a writ with respect to the Court’s denial of their ex parte. We are required
to personally serve all counsel and the trial court. Plesae advise if the Court will accept service of the
writ by email, and if so, if this email address is acceptable. Mr. Johnson has already agreed to service
of the writ by email. 49
Note that this question pertains to the service copy, unrelated to the filing requirements for a writ.
Thank you,
Margaret P. Stevens | Founder
Stevens Law, PC – Forge Ahead
p: (310) 272-8101 a: 5900 Wilshire Blvd, Floor 12, Los Angeles, CA 90036
From: Arnold, Vivian [mailto:Vivian.Arnold@riverside.courts.ca.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 1:55 PM
To: Margaret Stevens
Cc: cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com; 'Mitzi Smith' ; Roselle Bloodsaw
; Emily Atherton
Subject: RE: GI Excellence v Padda
Good afternoon Counsel,
Just a gentle reminder all trial documents and the order/recommendation from the neutral need to
be submitted to the court as soon as possible.
Also 150 juror will be reporting for this trial Monday at 1:30 pm.
Thank you,
Vivian Arnold
Courtroom assistant
Southwest Justice Center
951-704-7615
From: Margaret Stevens
Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 4:50 PM
To: Arnold, Vivian
Cc: cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com; 'Mitzi Smith' ; Roselle Bloodsaw
; Emily Atherton
Subject: GI Excellence v Padda
Dear Ms. Arnold, 50
Attached are courtesy copies of (1) Second Supplemental Declaration of Margaret P. Stevens, and (2)
Declaration of Jennifer A. Linehat, MD Dated May 15, 2018.
My declaration was filed prior to 4 pm, but I just received the Declaration of Dr. Linehat so I was
unable to file it prior to 4:00 p.m. Please note that Dr. Linehat is not available at any time on
Thursday due to her surgery schedule, but is available tomorrow between 11:30 am and 3:00 pm. I
have conferred with Mr. Johnson and he will make himself available during that time should the
Court wish to move the hearing from Thursday morning, as am I.
Sincerely,
Margaret P. Stevens | Founder
Stevens Law, PC – Forge Ahead
p: (310) 272-8101 a: 5900 Wilshire Blvd, Floor 12, Los Angeles, CA 90036
51
From: Arnold, Vivian
To: Leslie Barela
Cc: Robin Meadow; Margaret P. Stevens (mstevens@stevenslawla.com)
Subject: RE: GI Excellence v. Padda (Writ): E-Service
Date: Thursday, May 17, 2018 11:12:03 AM
Thank you Ms. Barela.
I will forward this service copy to Judge Marquez.
Thank you,
Vivian Arnold
Courtroom assistant
Southwest Justice Center
951-704-7615
From: Leslie Barela
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2018 11:08 AM
To: Arnold, Vivian
Cc: Robin Meadow ; Margaret P. Stevens (mstevens@stevenslawla.com)

Subject: GI Excellence v. Padda (Writ): E-Service
Importance: High
Ms. Arnold,
Pursuant to your agreement with Ms. Stevens—you are hereby
electronically served with the Petition for Writ of Mandate, Prohibition,
or Other Appropriate Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for filing.
Regards,
Leslie Barela | Legal Assistant to Robin Meadow
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP
5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90036
(310) 859-7811 | LinkedIn | Twitter
52
From: Margaret Stevens
To: Robin Meadow; Leslie Barela
Subject: FW: GIE v Padda
Date: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 8:09:59 PM
From: Craig Johnson
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 8:00 PM
To: Mitzi Smith ; Margaret Stevens
Cc: Roselle Bloodsaw ; Emily Atherton

Subject: Re: GIE v Padda
I agree to accept service via email.
Craig Johnson
Johnson Law Firm APC
951.353.8000 office
951.353.8003 fax
951.206.4156 direct
From: Margaret Stevens
Sent: Wednesday, May 16, 2018 7:27:24 PM
To: cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com; Mitzi Smith
Cc: Roselle Bloodsaw; Emily Atherton
Subject: GIE v Padda
Craig,
Please confirm you will accept service of the writ via email in lieu of the personal service
requiremnent under the code.
Thank you,
Margaret
Margaret P. Stevens | Founder
Stevens Law, PC – Forge Ahead
p: (310) 272-8101 a: 5900 Wilshire Blvd, Floor 12, Los Angeles, CA 90036
53
From: Leslie Barela
To: "cjohnson@johnsonlawapc.com"
Cc: Robin Meadow; Margaret P. Stevens (mstevens@stevenslawla.com)
Subject: GI Excellence v. Padda (Writ): E-Service
Date: Thursday, May 17, 2018 11:10:00 AM
Attachments: 2018-05-17 - Padda Writ Petition_FINAL.pdf
2018-05-17 - Padda Exhibits ISO Writ Petition_FINAL.pdf
Importance: High
Mr. Johnson:
Pursuant to your agreement with Ms. Stevens—you are hereby
electronically served with the Petition for Writ of Mandate, Prohibition,
or Other Appropriate Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
and Exhibits In Support of Petition for Writ of Mandate, Prohibition,
or Other Appropriate Relief to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for
filing.
Regards,
Leslie Barela | Legal Assistant to Robin Meadow
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP
5900 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90036
(310) 859-7811 | LinkedIn | Twitter
Read the latest appellate tips and strategies from GMSR.
54

Outcome: Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of
Riverside County to vacate its order of May 16, 2018, in Riverside Superior Court
case No. MCC1400959, denying petitioners’ ex parte application for a continuance of the trial, and to enter a new and different order granting the request. The temporary stay imposed by this court is LIFTED. Each party to bear their own costs. Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: