Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit

Case Number: 52,002-JAC

Judge: Shonda D Stone

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit

Plaintiff's Attorney: name

Defendant's Attorney: Jan P. Christiansen
Hugh Cameron Murray
Scotty Wayne Lowery
KEESHA MASON BORDELON
JOHNNY LEE SANDERS, II

Description: Hammond is the mother of three minor children, N.B., age 9 years;
I.B., age 6 years; and P.B., age 3 years.1 On July 3, 2015, deputies with the
Ouachita Sheriff’s Department arrived at the home of Russell Flowers
(“Flowers”) in response to a 911 call concerning a drowning. Upon their
arrival, deputies discovered the unresponsive body of Hammond’s five-year-
old daughter, B.B. After several attempts by paramedics to resuscitate B.B.,
she was transported by ambulance to the hospital, where she was
pronounced dead. For approximately 6 months prior to B.B.’s death,
Hammond and the four minor children were living with Flowers in his
home. Flowers is the father of Hammond’s youngest child, P.B. On the day
of B.B.’s death, Hammond reported she and B.B. were behind Flowers’
house when B.B. climbed into a tree and fell into the

1 Pursuant to URCA 5-1 and 5-2, the initials of the children are used to protect the minor children’s identity.
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Ouachita River. She stated she retrieved B.B. from the river, carried her
inside the house, and placed her in the bathtub to warm her up. After she
removed B.B. from the tub, Hammond placed the child on the bed and began
performing CPR.
An autopsy report revealed that B.B.’s death was caused by multiple
blunt force injuries to her head and lower extremities, which appeared to
have been inflicted by a belt. There was no evidence that the minor child
had drowned. B.B.’s body contained blunt force injuries that had already
begun to heal, indicating the injuries had been there a while. Four days after
B.B.’s death, while being formally questioned by authorities, Hammond
reported that Flowers had actually beaten B.B. to death and had forced
Hammond to corroborate the lie. N.B. and I.B. were also forced to lie to law
enforcement concerning the cause of B.B.’s death. Ultimately, both
Hammond and Flowers were arrested and charged with the second degree
murder of B.B. The charges against both are currently pending.
On July 6, 2015, Ashlee Green (“Green”) of DCFS filed an affidavit
in support of an instanter order which stated the State had received a report
of alleged neglect/lack of adequate supervision, death by abuse and bruises
concerning B.B. and the allegation of lack of supervision of N.B., I.B., and
P.B. The surviving three children had bruises and otherwise showed signs
of abuse and neglect. Green stated there was good cause to remove the
children from the custody of the parent/caretaker pending the completion of
the investigation and the filing of reports to the district attorney. The
instanter order was issued, and the three children were placed in the
temporary custody of DCFS.
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A Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) was appointed to
represent the children. At a hearing to continue custody with DCFS,
Flowers stipulated that the children were in need of care without admitting
the allegations against him, as did Hammond and Nicholas Brister
(“Brister”), the father of N.B., I.B., and B.B. The court found that remaining
in DCFS custody was in the best interest of the children, and they were
subsequently adjudicated as children in need of care.
The three children were originally placed in separate foster homes;
however, according to the record, all three children are now placed together
in one home. The primary goal of Hammond’s case plan was reunification,
with a secondary goal of adoption. The case plan included domains for
parenting, housing, income, mental health, substance abuse, visitation, and
domestic violence.
Approximately a year and a half after the children were placed in
foster care, DCFS issued a recommendation that the goal of the case plan
change from reunification to adoption. A report was written by DCFS to the
trial court on June 1, 2016, and by the CASA on June 3, 2016, in
anticipation of a permanency hearing, which was held on July 14, 2016. The
trial court ruled the permanent plan should be changed from reunification to
adoption.2
On November 15, 2016, DCFS petitioned the trial court to terminate
Hammond’s parental rights of the three minor children. After the
termination hearing, the trial court found DCFS proved by clear and
convincing evidence Hammond’s parental rights of the three minor children

2 This Court affirmed that judgment in State of La. in the Interest of N.B., I.B., and P.B. 51,374 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/15/17), 215 So. 3d 398.
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should be terminated due to her misconduct pursuant to La. Ch. C. art.
1015(4), as well as her failure to substantially comply with her case plan and
no reasonable expectation of improvement, pursuant to La. Ch. C. art.
1015(6). Furthermore, the trial court determined it was in the best interest of
the three minor children that the parental rights of Hammond be terminated.
The trial court terminated Hammond’s parental rights and certified the
children eligible for adoption. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Recuse
In her first assignment of error, Hammond argues the trial court erred
in denying her motion to recuse. According to Hammond, during the child
in need of care (“CINC”) proceedings, the trial court was privy to evidence
and information that may not have been relevant or admissible in the
termination of parental rights proceedings. Therefore, the trial court should
have recused itself from the termination hearing or referred the motion to
recuse to another court for a hearing. The trial court denied Hammond’s
motion to recuse, finding Hammond’s allegations to be speculative and not
based on any specific grounds.
La. C.C.P. art. 151 provides the grounds upon which a judge shall be
recused from a matter. Specifically, La. C.C.P. art. 151 provides in pertinent
part:
A. A judge of any court, trial or appellate, shall be recused when he ...

(4) Is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties’ attorneys or any witness to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.
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The grounds for recusal enumerated in Article 151 are exclusive and
do not include a “substantial appearance of the possibility of bias” or even a
“mere appearance of impropriety” as causes for removing a judge from
presiding over a given action. Slaughter v. Bd. of Sup’rs of S. Univ. & Agr.
& Mech. Coll., 2010-1114 (La. App. 1 Cir. 08/02/11), 76 So. 3d 465, 471,
writ denied, 2011-2112 (La. 01/13/12), 77 So. 3d 970. Moreover, a judge is
presumed to be impartial. The party seeking to recuse cannot merely allege
lack of impartiality; he must present some factual basis. Further, the bias,
prejudice, or personal interest alleged must be of a substantial nature and
based on more than conclusory allegations. Covington v. McNeese State
Univ., 2010-0250 (La. 04/05/10), 32 So. 3d 223, 225.
If a valid ground for recusal is set forth in the motion to recuse, the
judge shall recuse himself or refer the motion to another judge for a hearing.
La. C. C. P. art. 154. However, when the motion to recuse fails to enunciate
valid grounds for recusal, the trial judge may deny the motion without
referring the matter to another judge. Lozier v. Estate of Elmer, 10-754 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 02/15/11), 64 So. 3d 237, 243, writ denied, 11-529 (La.
04/25/11), 62 So. 3d 93. A trial court has discretion to determine if there is a
valid ground for recusal set forth in the motion. Frierson v. Frierson, 14-64
(La. App. 4 Cir. 07/02/14), 2014 WL 3045068, 2014 La. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 399, writ denied, 14-1628 (La. 08/22/14), 146 So. 3d 540.
This Court finds the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Hammond’s motion to recuse. Hammond’s motion did not set forth
any specific allegations that would form the basis for a recusal. Hammond’s
argument only assumed the trial court, in hearing both the CINC and the
termination of parental rights matters, may be unable to maintain
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impartiality in its ruling in the termination proceedings. The motion is mere
speculation and seems to be more of a policy argument that the judge who
hears the CINC matter should refrain from hearing the termination of
parental rights matter. For the same reasons, we find the trial did not err in
its refusal to reassign the motion to another judge for determination of its
merits. Notably, after the trial court’s denial, Hammond sought supervisory
writs concerning whether the judge should have referred the motion to
another division. This Court declined to exercise supervisory jurisdiction
and denied the writ.
Additionally, this Court is not aware of any law that prevents a judge
from presiding over both the CINC and the termination of parental rights
proceedings. The 4th Judicial District Court, Juvenile Section, has a
designated juvenile section wherein the judge in that section shall primarily
handle juvenile matters. La. Dist. Ct. Rules, App. 3.1. The Honorable
Sharon Marchman is the designated juvenile judge in the 4th Judicial
District and, as such, she retains jurisdiction to preside over all cases
involving juveniles, including but not limited to delinquency proceedings,
child in need of care, families in need of services, involuntary or voluntary
termination of parental rights, adoption, and any other proceedings necessary
to carry out the laws affecting juveniles, their parents, and sibling groups.
Id. The 4th Judicial District Juvenile Court has not adopted any rule
requiring separate judges to preside over CINC proceedings and termination
of parental rights proceedings. This assignment of error is without merit.
Termination of Parental Rights
In her next assignment of error, Hammond argues the trial court erred
in finding DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence her parental rights
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should be terminated, and the termination was in the best interest of the
minor children. Hammond contends she has substantially complied with the
case plan, and the best interest of the children dictates she should be given
additional time to complete the case plan. We do not agree.
The trial court’s factual findings in termination of parental rights cases
are subject to the manifest error standard of review. State ex rel. B.H. v.
A.H., 42,864 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So. 2d 881; State in the Interest
of K.L.B. v. Biggs, 29,512 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/97), 690 So. 2d 965. The
manifest error standard requires the appellate court to determine whether the
record reflects the trial court was clearly wrong. State in the Interest of
H.A.B., 10-1111 (La. 10/19/10), 49 So. 3d 345, 368.
DCFS’ Burden of Proof
The parental rights of an individual may be involuntarily terminated
upon a showing of one of the statutory grounds found in La. Ch. C. art.
1015. Termination of parental rights is a severe and final action, so the state
must satisfy an onerous burden of proof, establishing each element of a
ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. La. Ch. C. art.
1035(A); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d
599 (1982); State ex rel. C.M.M. v. T.P.M., 42,238 (La. App. 2 Cir.
05/09/07), 957 So. 2d 330.
In this case, DCFS sought to have Hammond’s parental rights
terminated under La. Ch. C. art. 1015(4) and (6). La. Ch. C. art. 1015(4)
states in pertinent part:
Misconduct of the parent toward this child or any other child of the parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of human decency, including but not limited to the
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conviction, commission, aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit any of the following:

(a) Murder. (b) Unjustified intentional killing.

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(h) A felony that has resulted in serious bodily injury.

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(i) Abuse or neglect which is chronic, life threatening, or results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement.

La. Ch. C. art. 1015(6) states:

Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent’s custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

The enumerated elements of La. Ch. C. 1015(6) require: (1) at least a year
has passed since the child was removed from the parent; (2) no substantial
compliance with the approved case plan; and (3) lack of any reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the near
future.
Indisputably, the first element has been satisfied as approximately 16
months passed between the initial instanter order on July 3, 2015, and
DCFS’ filing of the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights on
November 16, 2016. The second element, lack of substantial compliance
with the case plan, is the most contentious issue in this matter. According to
La. Ch. C. art. 1036(C), lack of substantial compliance with the case plan
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can be shown by one or more of seven circumstances, five of which are
relevant here. Those circumstances include:
(3) The parent’s failure to keep the department apprised of the parent’s whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent’s ability to comply with the case plan for services.

(4) The parent’s failure to contribute to the costs of the child’s foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan.

(5) The parent’s repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.

(6) The parent’s lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.

(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.

The third element of La. Ch. C. art 1015(5) requires the lack of any
reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in
the near future and is explained in La. Ch. C. art. 1036(D) as being shown by
one or more of:
(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

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(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

The court looks for a reasonable expectation of reformation, found
when the parent has cooperated with state officials and shown improvement;
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not all existing problems need be eliminated. State in Interest of S.M., 98
0922 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So. 2d 445. The court clarified that reformation is
more than cooperation with state agencies, but rather a significant,
substantial indication of reform, such as significantly modifying the
behavior that caused the child’s removal from the home. Id.
In its reasons for judgment, the trial court considered the testimony of
Vernata Delmore (“Delmore”), a case worker for DCFS. DCFS prepared a
case plan for Hammond, which included domains for parenting, housing,
income, mental health, substance abuse, visitation, and domestic violence.
Delmore, who no longer works for DCFS, testified that while she was
Hammond’s case worker, Hammond never completed any part of the case
plan. As to housing, Hammond had moved several times while the case was
pending. After leaving Flowers’ home, she initially lived with her parents,
next with Brister, and thereafter moved to a house in West Monroe as a
roommate with Tammy Jo Hammond. In November 2015, Hammond
married Lindsay Hammond (“Lindsay”), who is the daughter of her former
roommate, Tammy. Hammond did not inform DCFS of the marriage prior
to her family team meeting on December 9, 2015. Hammond and Lindsay
moved into a three-bedroom, two-bath home. Delmore testified the home
appeared to be located in a quiet neighborhood and had adequate food and
utilities; however, Delmore stated the house was likely unsafe for the
children because it was located near a snake oxidation pond, and Hammond
reported almost being bitten by a snake. Delmore testified Hammond’s
housing history caused the agency concern because she moves so frequently
and appears unstable.
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Delmore also expressed concerns with Hammond’s temperament and
anger issues. According to Delmore, Hammond was a volatile hothead who
cursed a lot, lost her composure, and was overly dramatic. Delmore
admitted she feared for her own safety at times. On one occasion,
Hammond called Delmore names and made threats to blow up the state
office building. Delmore’s greatest concern was that Hammond’s actions
and outbursts habitually happened in front of the children, often upsetting
them.
When Hammond was not upsetting the children, she was overly
showering them with gifts. Delmore testified she routinely supervised the
visits between Hammond, N.B., I.B., and P.B. According to Delmore
“every visit was like Christmas for the kids.” Delmore testified that when
observing other parents, she often witnessed the parents assisting the
children with homework or discussing their adjustment into a foster home.
Delmore stated the only parenting practice she observed with Hammond was
Hammond’s ability and willingness to provide gifts. Delmore indicated over
half of Hammond’s visit was spent unwrapping presents and putting toys
together. According to Delmore, the interactions between Hammond and
the children did not seem sincere, and the gifts were a distraction. Delmore
questioned what the children’s responses would be when the glamour was
gone and every day was not Christmas. Delmore recommended Hammond
stop bringing so many gifts and instead do more interactive things with the
children; however, Hammond’s response was that “those were her damn
children and she’ll do what she wants with them.”
Delmore also testified DCFS amended Hammond’s case plan to
include her wife, Lindsay. Delmore stated there was concern from the
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agency about Hammond’s failure to disclose Lindsay’s extensive criminal
history, which includes numerous drug charges, simple battery, issuing
worthless checks, simple criminal damage to property, theft, and probation
violations. When Delmore voiced her concerns about Hammond’s recent
marriage to Lindsay and Lindsay’s background, Hammond responded that
she can “do what the fuck she want to do with her life.”
The trial court also considered the testimony of Letoshia Ross
(“Ross”), the foster care supervisor for DCFS. Like Delmore, Ross
contended Hammond did not successfully comply with any portion of the
case plan. Ross admitted Hammond and Lindsay’s current housing would
be adequate for the children, but for the fact that Hammond moved so much
and DCFS was not always aware of whom Hammond resided with.
Ross also discussed Hammond’s income and her ability to
independently provide for the needs of the children. Hammond currently
relies on Lindsay’s income. Lindsay receives a monthly income of $5,000
from an inheritance and received a lump sum of approximately $200,000 in
2016. Ross testified she told Hammond that although Lindsay is financially
stable, pays the rent on the home, and earns sufficient money to support
Hammond and the children, she needed to have her own income instead of
relying solely on Lindsay’s. Ross suggested Hammond get a job, however,
Hammond has yet to do so. Ross also indicated that, as part of Hammond’s
case plan, Hammond was required to provide $50 per month to help with the
needs of the children. Hammond failed to comply with this directive.
Moreover, Ross discussed the agency’s concern of whether, due to her
mental and physical health, Hammond would be able to appropriately care
for the three minor children. Ross testified that during one of the family
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meetings, Hammond stated she had visited the emergency room hundreds of
times in 2016 for various health reasons. DCFS was uncertain if Hammond
would be able to physically care for the children with the stomach condition,
gastroparesis, and with Hammond being occasionally hospitalized, and her
regular visits to the ER. When asked if she believed she would be able to
care for the children, Hammond’s response was that if she could not care for
them, Lindsay could do it, and if Lindsay could not, Lindsay’s mother could.
Additionally, although Hammond had done specific things outlined in her
case plan, Ross worried that Hammond was seeing so many different doctors
and she was not advising them of the different medications prescribed by the
others. There was one period where Hammond was taking Klonopin,
Trazodone, Cymbalta, Seroquel, and OxyContin - all prescribed by different
doctors.
As it pertains to the substance abuse aspect of Hammond’s case plan,
Ross testified that Hammond’s drug screens always had a negative result;
however, there were issues regarding Hammond’s failure to appear for the
drug screens on the same day she was requested to do so. Hammond’s case
plan required her to report to the screening site within 24 hours of receiving
a request from DCFS. According to Ross, there were several instances when
Hammond showed up past the 24-hour deadline, and provided no legitimate
reason for her noncompliance.
Ross also testified about Hammond’s treatment with Dr. Beatrice
Tatum (“Dr. Tatum”). Hammond began counseling with Dr. Tatum in
November 2015 for parenting skills, grief, domestic violence, and anger
management. Dr. Tatum informed DCFS that Hammond was cooperative
with the case plan, had completed the parenting sessions, and is making
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progress in other areas of the program. Ross testified that although Dr.
Tatum indicated Hammond completed the parenting sessions, Hammond has
yet to demonstrate the things she learned in those sessions, particularly Dr.
Tatum’s suggestions on how Hammond should behave during and after her
visits with the children. Ross believed Dr. Tatum’s reports were based
solely on what Hammond told her she was doing, not what Dr. Tatum
personally observed at any of the visits. Ross stated Dr. Tatum believed
Hammond was internalizing Dr. Tatum’s suggestions and implementing
them during her visitations with the children. Ross asserted Dr. Tatum never
actually monitored or saw Hammond with the children, so Dr. Tatum had no
first-hand knowledge of whether Hammond demonstrated her learned
parenting skills, which according to Ross, Hammond did not.
Ross discussed DCFS’ concern with Hammond’s pending criminal
charge for B.B.’s death. Ross stated that one of the requirements of
Hammond’s case plan is Hammond resolve all criminal matters. The
children have already been in DCFS’ care for 18 months and Ross worries
that prolonging permanency for the children until a decision is made in
Hammond’s criminal case is unhealthy, and in fact, detrimental for the
children.
We find the trial court did not commit manifest error in determining
DCFS met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
for which Hammond’s parental rights were terminated. First, as it pertains
to La. Ch. C. 1015(4), DCFS concluded that based on the autopsy
information received on B.B., B.B. died due to neglect and/or abuse. The
reports indicated B.B. had severe bruising over her legs, body, upper torso,
and extensive inner bruising to the internal areas. During trial, Hammond
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admitted the children were repeatedly spanked and beaten by Flowers, but
denied ever beating the children herself. However, the trial court found
Hammond noncredible as a witness, and in fact found her to be rather
manipulative and her testimony contrived.
The record reflects that both N.B. and I.B. revealed they were
repeatedly beaten by Flowers and Hammond. Dr. Lawanna Gunn-Williams
(“Dr. Gunn-Williams”), an expert in the fields of psychotherapy and
marriage and family counseling, testified N.B. reported that after Hammond
and Flowers would beat them, they would make the children sit in hot water
to remove the scars and bruises. Dr. Gunn-Williams also stated that on the
day B.B. died, N.B. reported that both Flowers and Hammond had beaten
B.B., and he was standing in the corner awaiting his beating. The trial court
apparently found the testimony of Dr. Gunn-Williams more credible than
that of Hammond. We find the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding
Hammond committed acts of misconduct in the form of abuse and/or neglect
toward the minor children which likely led or contributed to B.B.’s sad and
unfortunate death.
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence indicating Hammond
has not substantially complied with her case plan, nor do her actions in any
way demonstrate there would be a significant improvement in her condition.
As to Hammond’s housing requirement, since B.B.’s death, Hammond has
failed to secure a safe and stable home for the children to live in. In the year
following the minor children’s removal by DCFS, Hammond moved at least
four times, and DCFS is uncertain as to her current housing situation.
Hammond has also failed to complete the income aspect of the case
plan. Hammond continues to rely solely on Lindsay’s inheritance payments,
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despite repeated recommendations and suggestions that she should seek an
independent source of income. Essentially, Hammond has no ability to
provide for the minor children but through Lindsay. Even more remarkable
is, notwithstanding Hammond’s assertion of Lindsay’s sufficient income,
Hammond failed to fulfill the aspect of the case plan which required she
contribute $50 per month (not per child) toward the children’s foster care.
The record also indicates Hammond failed to show she could
appropriately parent the minor children. This is evident by Hammond’s
frequent cursing and inappropriate outbursts while in the children’s
presence, as well as her inability to have meaningful interaction with them
without distracting the children with the excessive gifts she provides. Even
when her case worker suggested she bring fewer gifts, Hammond continued
to overpower her visits with gifts and was not receptive to the critique.
Additionally disturbing are Hammond’s significant health issues that have
caused her to make at least 100 emergency room visits in one year. Even
more alarming is Hammond’s rather dismissive assertion that if she can’t
care for the children, Lindsay can, and if Lindsay can’t, Lindsay’s mother
will, and so on and so forth. Hammond’s willingness to pass her children
from one person to the next further demonstrates her inability to effectively
and responsibly parent.
However, what is perhaps this Court’s greatest concern is the pending
second-degree murder case against Hammond, and Hammond’s decisions
before and after B.B.’s death. Hammond testified she initially moved in
with Flowers because he was a family friend and he was willing to help her
with the children. Hammond further claimed she stayed with Flowers
because he padlocked the doors and prevented her from leaving. Dr. Tatum
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testified that Hammond told her that while she and the children lived with
Flowers, Flowers gave her and N.B. black eyes; made B.B. sit in a cold tub
of water for hours if she wet herself; forced N.B. and B.B. to take their
clothes off and lie on the floor together; and prevented the children from
eating, sometimes two or three days at a time.
The record indicates Hammond facilitated the death of B.B. by either
beating her and/or subsequently trying to help Flowers conceal what
happened. After exposing her children to such trauma, degradation, abuse,
and by allowing them to remain in this abysmal situation, Hammond has
now married Lindsay, someone with an extensive criminal history, which
includes drug and assault charges, and Hammond continues to support her
children’s reunification and return to live with her and Lindsay. When faced
with criticism about her decision, Hammond’s response that she can “do
what the fuck she want to do with her life” is clear evidence that Hammond
is selfish and her main priority is herself. It is this unchanging mentality and
the failure to meaningfully address her self-serving attitude that should
prevent any attempts at a successful and healthy long-term reunification with
her children. Pursuant to the provisions of La. Ch. C. art. 1036(C), this
evidence more than convincingly establishes the lack of any reasonable
expectation of significant improvement by Hammond.
Based upon this record, we cannot say the trial court was clearly
wrong in finding the state proved with clear and convincing evidence that
Hammond has failed to substantially comply with the case plan, or that there
is any reasonable expectation that she will improve.


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Best Interest of the Minor Children
In addition to finding a statutory ground has been proven, the judge
must also find termination is in the best interest of the child under La. Ch. C.
art. 1039. See State in Interest of M.L. & P.L., 95-0045 (La. 09/05/95), 660
So. 2d 830, 832.
While a parent has a natural fundamental interest in the continuing
companionship, care, and custody of their children, the child has a profound
interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit
establishing secure, stable, long-term and continuous relationships found in a
home with proper parental care. La. Ch. C. art. 1001; State ex rel. J.T.,
46,174 (La. App. 2 Cir. 03/02/11), 58 So. 3d 1015.
In balancing these interests, the courts of this state have consistently
found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent. State
ex rel. G.J.L., 00-3278 (La. 06/29/01), 791 So. 2d 80; State ex rel. A.R.H. v.
Hines, 35,800 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/27/02), 810 So. 2d 1166. In all
proceedings, when a ground justifying termination of parental rights is
proven, the primary concern is to secure the best interest of the child. Id.
The focus of an involuntary termination proceeding is not whether the parent
should be deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of
the child for all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. Id.
Children have the right to live in a safe, secure environment and to be
reared by someone, who is capable of caring for them. Indubitably, children
have a need for permanency. As the Supreme Court has previously noted,
this need has been recognized on both a federal and state level. State ex rel.
H.A.B., 2010-1111 (La. 10/19/10), 49 So. 3d 345, 370.
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Hammond allowed N.B., I.B., P.B., and B.B. to endure
incomprehensible situations. She also partook in these horrific incidents of
abuse and neglect toward her children. Dr. Gunn-Williams testified that
N.B., the oldest child, has unresolved issues and questions concerning why
Hammond never helped him, but instead would assist Flowers in inflicting
abuse upon him. Dr. Gunn-Williams stated, as a result of the physical and
emotional abuse, N.B. has developed complex post-traumatic stress disorder.
N.B. has a fear of Hammond, Flowers, and of being removed from his foster
home. Dr. Gunn-Williams opined that moving N.B. in with Hammond at
this stage would be detrimental for N.B.
Furthermore, Hammond still has a second degree murder charge
pending against her for the death of B.B. Despite her certainty that she will
be acquitted, that remains to be seen. In the interim, the children have been
in foster care since July 2015, and they are thriving in the home of their
foster parent. When questioned about the children and whether they were
thriving in their foster home, Delmore testified that the last time she was in
contact with the children, they were safe and being excellently cared for in
the home of their foster parent, who has indicated she would like to adopt all
three of the children. Delmore informed the juvenile court that she has
never been more satisfied with child placements than in this case and that all
of the children’s needs are being met. These children deserve stability and
permanency, something Hammond has yet to provide them. Termination of
Hammond’s parental rights was clearly in the best interest of the children,
and the trial court’s determination was not in error.


20

Restrictions on the role of co-counsel
In her last assignment of error, Hammond argues the trial court abused
its discretion in restricting the role of her co-counsel during trial. Hammond
contends the restriction needlessly limited the representation she received
and violated her right to counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that there is a
presumption in favor of a party’s right to choose counsel. Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 158, 160, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1696, 1697-1698, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 140 (1988). In civil matters as well as criminal matters, the right to
counsel includes the right to legal representation of one’s choice. McCuin v.
Texas Power, 714 F. 2d 1255, 1257. This right is “one of constitutional
dimensions and should be freely exercised without impingement.” The right
to counsel of choice is not absolute. Id. at 1262, 1263. This right can be
overridden only if it can be proven that there is a compelling reason to do so.
Id.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that this right
cannot be manipulated to obstruct the orderly procedure of the courts and
cannot be used to interfere with the fair administration of justice. State v.
Champion, 412 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (La. 1982); State v. Johnson, 389 So. 2d
1302, 1304 (La. 1980); State v. Jones, 376 So. 2d 125, 129 (La. 1979); State
v. Lee, 364 So. 2d 1024, 1028 (La. 1978); State v. Anthony, 347 So. 2d 483,
487 (La. 1977). In order for a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s right to
counsel to be upset, there must be a showing of clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Ventris, 10-889 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 79 So. 3d 1108, 1119.
Cameron Murray (“Murray”), Hammond’s attorney in her second
degree murder case, filed a supplemental motion to enroll as co-counsel in
21

the termination proceedings. In the supplemental motion, Murray asserted
that because the termination of rights matter would involve significant issues
of criminal law, his experience in the area of criminal defense would be
necessary to protect Hammond’s interests. Murray also stated his role
would be to assist lead counsel, Jan P. Christiansen (“Christiansen”), in
areas of the trial where knowledge of criminal law are crucial. The trial
court granted Murray’s motion for the limited purpose of assisting
Christiansen in the areas of the trial where knowledge of criminal law are
crucial and only to the extent that Murray’s representation did not conflict
with existing trial dates. Murray subsequently filed a second supplemental
motion requesting he be allowed to enroll without any limitations. The trial
court denied the second supplemental motion and noted Murray’s initial
motion was granted for limited purposes, as Murray originally requested.
We find the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the role of
Murray. There is no evidence Hammond was denied the right to counsel at
any stage in the proceeding nor is there any evidence that Hammond’s right
to counsel was denied by any limitations requested by and imposed on co
counsel. This assignment of error is without merit.

Outcome: For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Clarissa H. Hammond’s motion to recuse. Additionally, we affirm the
decision of the trial court in favor of the Department of Children and Family
Services, and against Clarissa H. Hammond, terminating her parental rights
as to the three minor children, N.B., I.B., and P.B. Finally, we affirm the
trial court’s decision to deny Clarissa Hammond’s second supplemental
motion to enroll. All costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Clarissa
Hammond.
AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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