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Date: 04-13-2018

Case Style:

State of Louisiana v. Dora Blake

Case Number: 51,972-KA

Judge: Shonda Stone

Court: COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

Plaintiff's Attorney: J. SCHUYLER MARVIN
District Attorney

ANDREW JACOBS
DALE NEWTON MONTGOMERY, II
Assistant District Attorneys

Defendant's Attorney: LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
By: Douglas Lee Harville

Description: On November GYO GWYiO PR was sitting as a rear
passenger in a vehicle driven by her son, Patrick Watkins PR. A
third occupant, Penny Knight-Franklin P-R, was sitting in
the front passenger seat of the car. The trio had just left from celebrating
a casino and were traveling east on I-20 in Bossier
Parish, Louisiana. According to a witness, the vehicle driven by Watkins
suddenly veered off the roadway and crashed into a tree line off the
Interstate. Blake exited the vehicle and stated she had been kidnapped, but
that she had shot her captors. An investigation into the incident revealed
Blake shot Knight-Franklin in the back and Watkins in the head. Watkins
was pronounced dead at the scene as a result of the gunshot wound.
Containers of alcohol were found in the back seat where Blake was sitting.
Blake was subsequently charged by bill of indictment with the second
degree murder of Watkins in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Blake was
charged in a separate bill of information with the attempted second degree
murder of Knight-Franklin in violation of La R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27.
On May 23, 2017, pursuant to an agreement with the state, Blake pled
guilty to the manslaughter of Watkins in violation of La. R.S. 14:31. In
exchange for her plea, the state agreed to refrain from charging Blake as a
habitual offender and to nolle prosequi the attempted second degree murder
2

charge. There was no agreement concerning the sentence to be imposed.
Prior to accepting her guilty plea, the trial court informed Blake of her
constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89
S. Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), including her right against self
incrimination, her right to confront and cross-examine her accusers, and her
right to a jury trial. Blake stated she understood her rights and wished to
A O
guilty plea and ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation
PR A
ucted on June 27, 2017. After
articulating the mitigating and aggravating factors of the case, the trial court
sentenced Blake to 40 years at hard labor. On June 29, 2017, Blake filed a
motion to reconsider sentence, citing her intoxication at the time of the
offense and her long history of alcoholism. The trial court denied the
motion. Blake now appeals arguing her sentence is excessive.
DISCUSSION
The offense of manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment at hard
labor for not more than 40 years. La. R.S. 14:31. Blake argues the trial

considering the mitigating circumstances of the case. Blake asserts she is an
alcoholic, suffers from depression, and has no memory of the shooting
A re O
40-year sentence will likely prove to be a life sentence.
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show the trial court took
cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court
3

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so long
as the record reflects the court adequately considered the guidelines of the
article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Lathan, 41,855
(La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/07), 953 So. 2d 890, writ denied, 2007-0805 (La.
03/28/08), 978 So. 2d 297.
The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C.
Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions.
Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence
imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full
compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475
(La. 1982); State v. Swayzer, 43,350 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/13/08), 989 So. 2d
267. The important elements which should be considered are the
defen PO O O O
employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and
the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981);
State v. Ates, 43,327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 08/13/08), 989 So. 2d 259, writ denied,
2008-2341 (La. 05/15/09), 8 So. 3d 581. There is no requirement that
specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v.
Shumaker, 41,547 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277, writ denied,
2007-0144 (La. 09/28/07), 964 So. 2d 351.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. Art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.
1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime
4

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the
sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La. 01/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;
State v. Robinson, 40,983 (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/24/07), 948 So. 2d 379.
A substantial advantage obtained by means of a plea bargain is a
legitimate consideration in sentencing. State v. Mendenhall, 48,028 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 05/15/13), 115 So. 3d 727; State v. Ross, 35,552 (La. App. 2 Cir.
02/27/02), 811 So. 2d 176. Accordingly, where a defendant has pled guilty
to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct or has received
a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement through a plea
bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even the maximum
sentence for the pled offense. State v. Givens, 45,354 (La. App. 2 Cir.
06/23/10), 42 So. 3d 451, writ denied, 10-1584 (La. 01/14/11), 52 So. 3d
902; State v. Germany, 43,239 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/30/08), 981 So. 2d 792;
State v. Black, 28,100 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/96), 669 So. 2d 667, writ
denied, 96-0836 (La. 09/20/96), 679 So. 2d 430.
The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits. On review, an appellate court does not determine
whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the
trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, 2003-3514 (La.
12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Thompson, 2002-0333 (La. 04/09/03), 842
So. 2d 330; State v. Robinson, 49,677 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/15/15), 163 So. 3d
829, 844, writ denied, 2015-0924 (La. 04/15/16), 191 So. 3d 1034.
O trial court noted it considered
aggravating and mitigating factors from its review of the PSI report and facts
of the case. The trial court read a statement prepared by Blake wherein she
described her lengthy history of alcoholism and drug addiction. She
5

attributed her actions on November 21, 2015, to the fact that she was highly
intoxicated and claimed to have no recollection of shooting her son or
Knight-Franklin. The trial court also
father detailing the emotional and financial losses he suffered as a result of
A the trial court impose the
maximum sentence on Blake.
Prior to sentencing Blake to 40 years at hard labor, the trial court
O D YR
history, which consisted of a 2011 simple arson conviction; 2)
actions constituted deliberate cruelty to her victims; 3) Blake knowingly
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person; 4)
Blake used actual violence in commission of the offense; 5) the offense
resulted in significant economic 2 l) the offense
involved multiple victims; and 7) Blake foreseeably endangered human life
during the commission of the offense.
history of alcoholism and steady employment record as mitigating factors
against a lengthy sentence. However, the trial court felt those mitigating
factors A
After a review of the record, we cannot find the trial court was
manifestly erroneous in sentencing Blake to the maximum allowable
sentence for manslaughter. The trial court considered Blak
and work history but found these mitigating factors were outweighed by the
A O ]f she had
known about treatment and AA meetings, maybe this would not have
A O
not provided with opportunities to seek substance abuse help. Prior to
6

pleading guilty to simple arson in 2011, Blake was initially charged with
aggravated arson and alcohol was involved in the commission of the offense.
Blake received a suspended five-year hard labor sentence with three years of
supervised probation. The trial court stated Blake most l
to obtain substance abuse treatment during her probation, but
instead, chose to continue drinking until something horrific occurred.
While the sentence imposed is the maximum permitted by law, it is
not constitutionally excessive. By pleading guilty to manslaughter, Blake

and to nolle prosequi the attempted second degree murder charge. However,
and unfortunately, the facts of this case depict a tragedy that could have been
avoided. As stated by the trial court, Blake desperately needs correctional
treatment that can be provided most effectively by her commitment to an
institution. Considering the tragic facts of this case, and the risk of harm
Blake created for Watkins, Knight-Franklin, and other motorists on I-20 the
night of the incident, we find the imposed sentence is not a purposeless and
needless infliction of pain and suffering, nor is it disproportionate to the
offense.

Outcome: Affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments:



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