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Date: 01-29-2022
Case Style:
SANDRA EPPERSON RICH vs JOHN D. RICH, ET AL
Case Number: 20-0440
Judge: J. Layne Smith
Court:
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
On appeal from The Circuit Court for Pinellas County
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Defendant's Attorney: Michael J. Park of Park, Ossian, Barnaky & Park, P.A.
Description:
Lakeland, FL - Divorce lawyer represented defendant appealing final judgment of dissolution of her marriage.
The parties have two children, and their marriage was of
moderate duration—lasting equally as long as the litigation in this
case. Both parties are well-educated attorneys—the Former Wife
also holds her LLM in taxation, and the Former Husband has a
master's degree in business administration.
At the forefront of this dispute lies an antenuptial agreement
(Agreement) and whether the Former Wife waived as part of that
Agreement her claim to any interest the Former Husband acquired
during the marriage in the companies controlled by the Former
Husband's father, along with any income, appreciation, and/or
proceeds of any sale of such interests.2
As shown by the recitals in
the Agreement, the parties intended to define their nonmarital
assets. The relevant portions of the Agreement provide:
2
The dissolution proceedings were bifurcated into two phases.
In Phase One, the trial court determined the existence, content, and
validity of the Agreement after a challenge by the Former Wife. The
trial court's ruling on the validity of the Agreement is not the
subject of this appeal.
4
WHEREAS, JOHN and SANDRA desire to fix and
determine by antenuptial agreement the right and claim
that will accrue to each other by reason of their
cohabitation and possible future marriage in the property
of the other, as set forth specifically hereinbelow, and in
certain property which may be hereinafter acquired, prior
to any marriage between the parties or hereinafter
acquired by inheritance or gift from the parents of either
party, or hereinafter acquired by becoming the
beneficiary of a trust established for the benefit of the
party if such trust is derived from funds or property from
a settlor from whom the party would otherwise inherit,
and to accept the provisions of this agreement, in lieu of
and in full discharge, settlement and satisfaction of all
such rights and claims in and to the said property set
forth specifically hereinbelow, and in property hereinafter
acquired prior to any marriage between the parties, to
property hereinafter acquired by inheritance or gift from
the parents of either party, to property hereinafter
acquired by becoming the beneficiary of a trust
established for the benefit of the party if such trust is
derived from funds or property from a settlor from whom
the party would otherwise inherit; and in certain limited
property acquired after marriage as specifically set forth
hereinbelow.
(Emphasis added.)
As to the Former Husband's nonmarital assets at issue here,
the Agreement provides that the following relevant assets were "free
and clear from any interest, claim or right of [the Former Wife]":
(a) That parcel of real property legally described as:
Island Estates, Unit #1, Lot 33, and, commonly known as
656 Normandy Road, Madeira Beach, Florida 33708, with
all improvements thereon or replacement thereof.
5
. . . .
(j) Any real or personal property [the Former Husband]
might come to receive in the future by inheritance or gift
from a third person, including all income and
appreciation of said property, and/or proceeds of any
sale of such property.
(k) [The Former Wife] agrees that at any time before or
after marriage, [the Former Husband] may establish for
himself a savings, money market or brokerage account in
his name that will be and remain his sole and divided
property, including all future payments and deposits
even though made from earnings, before or after the
marriage, as well as any earnings, interest, appreciation
or equity that may accrue to said account, and [the
Former Husband] may make monthly deposits in this
account in the amount of up to five hundred dollars
($500) less any marital assets actually used or paid into
or applied to from his earnings the real property
described in paragraph 1(a), above. This amount is
intended to approximately represent one-half the amount
of marital assets, if any, applied to the real property
described in paragraph 1(a), above, for indebtedness,
taxes, maintenance, repairs, improvements or
replacements, all as reduced by tax benefits derived by
[the Former Husband] and [the Former Wife] from
deduction of mortgage interest, points, taxes, or other
costs and expenses made on the real property herein
described in paragraph 1(a) above. This provision
creating sole and separate property shall apply to any
assets, or portions or percentages thereof, purchased at
any time specifically from the proceeds or balance of the
account contemplated in this paragraph.
(l) Any interest [the Former Husband] may come to
receive by way of gift, inheritance or otherwise in the
business and corporation known as Bannum,
Incorporated, and its affiliates and successors.
6
(Emphasis added.)
Both parties worked at the Former Wife's father's law firm
earning modest salaries at the start of the marriage. In 2001, the
Former Husband left the law practice to work for his father; he
served as corporate counsel and was a shareholder of both Bannum
and KMG. Bannum owns a number of subsidiaries that build
halfway houses for the Department of Justice. Each Bannum
company pays management fees to KMG for the management of
these facilities. In 2002, the Former Husband and his father
entered into an agreement whereby shares of stock in Bannum and
KMG were gifted to the Former Husband—these shares represented
twenty five percent of the stock in these two companies. The
Former Wife concedes that these shares constitute nonmarital
property under the terms of the Agreement.
In 2006, the Former Husband acquired an additional twenty
percent interest in Bannum and KMG, which he claims was
acquired after a capital call and purchased with nonmarital funds.
However, the Former Wife argues that these twenty percent
7
interests were purchased with marital funds and are therefore
marital assets subject to equitable distribution.
During the marriage the Former Husband also established his
own legal consulting company, 656 R/E Venture, Inc., and opened
a number of bank accounts in 656 R/E Venture's name.
The marriage came to an end in September of 2009, when the
Former Husband filed for divorce. The Former Wife filed a
counterpetition alleging, among other claims, that 656 R/E Venture
is a marital asset and that certain nonmarital assets lost their
nonmarital character as a result of the Former Husband's
commingling of those nonmarital assets with marital assets.
While the dissolution proceedings were pending, in 2012,
Arnold Rich, KMG, and ARICH Family filed civil complaints, in what
can only be described as "friendly" lawsuits, suing the Former
Husband for amounts allegedly owed by the Former Husband
pursuant to lines of credit secured by all personal and corporate
assets owned by the Former Husband and executed after the
dissolution proceedings commenced.3
The Former Husband did not
3
After the commencement of the dissolution proceeding and
prior to the "friendly" lawsuits, the Former Husband's father also
8
defend these lawsuits or the execution proceedings on the resulting
judgments entered against him. Based on the dissipation of these
assets, the Former Wife joined the Additional Defendants
contending that they had committed nefarious acts by creating liens
for the sole purpose of squandering the marital estate. See Martinez
v. Martinez, 219 So. 3d 259, 262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ("Under
principles of equity, a trial court may determine whether a third
person has acted with a spouse to deprive the other spouse of his or
her share in the marital estate. However, for the court to make a
complete determination of the case before it, that person . . . must
be joined as a party to the action. . . .").
In Phase One of the final hearing, the trial court determined
that the Agreement was valid and enforceable. In its findings, the
trial court found all parties to be less than credible: it found the
Former Wife's lack of knowledge of a certain bank account
filed, in his individual capacity and as the majority shareholder of
Bannum and KMG, a civil lawsuit against the Former Husband and
the Former Wife. In that lawsuit he sought to prevent the Former
Wife from claiming an interest in any and all assets related to his
companies that were acquired by the Former Husband during the
marriage, and among other relief, to enjoin the Former Wife from
"taking any action which is inconsistent with the terms and spirit of
the [Agreement]."
9
"completely fabricated" when on cross-examination she admitted to
endorsing and depositing a check in that account, and it found that
the Former Husband and Arnold Rich were "less than full and frank
regarding their business dealings . . . at the time the Parties signed
the [Agreement]" but that regardless, their general disclosure was
adequate. The trial court deferred the issue of how the Agreement
would be interpreted and enforced in the area of equitable
distribution for Phase Two of the final hearing, along with the issue
of the Former Husband's unclean hands.
With the validity of the Agreement solidified in Phase One, the
Additional Defendants filed a renewed motion for partial summary
judgment (Renewed Motion), seeking a ruling that pursuant to the
Agreement the Former Wife waived any and all interest in any
appreciation in value of the gifted twenty-five percent of stock in
Bannum and KMG; the later-acquired twenty percent of stock in
Bannum and KMG; and all interests formerly held by the Former
Husband in his father's businesses. In its order granting the
Renewed Motion, the trial court determined that the Agreement was
clear and unambiguous as to the use of the term "affiliates" and
dismissed with prejudice all claims against the Additional
10
Defendants "which relate to or which are based on [the Former
Husband's] ownership interests at any time during the marriage in
the companies of [Arnold Rich], or to any income, appreciation
and/or proceeds of the sales of such interests," finding such to be
contemplated under the Agreement.
A final hearing was conducted almost a decade after the
Former Husband filed his petition and after seven appeals. The
Former Wife testified that the Former Husband deposited his
earnings, including his salary, bonuses, and distributions into
various accounts of 656 R/E Venture. According to the Former
Wife, these monies were later used to purchase the marital home
the parties resided in just prior to these proceedings.
In support of these allegations, the Former Wife admitted into
evidence financial records of the Former Husband and the
Additional Defendants, including banking and accounting records
prepared by third parties. The Former Wife testified that she
obtained these financial records—which she contends were
withheld from discovery—through nontraditional methods,
specifically, rummaging through the dumpster behind the Former
11
Husband's accountant's office.4
While the Former Husband and the
Additional Defendants initially objected to the admission of the
"dumpster documents," those objections were ultimately withdrawn,
and the Former Husband did not dispute the documents'
substantive accuracy or legitimacy. Indeed, the Former Husband
and the Additional Defendants conceded at oral argument that they
knowingly and voluntarily waived, on the record below, any
accountant-client privileges with respect to these "dumpster
documents" and stipulated to the admission of those records into
evidence at trial.
The Former Husband testified at trial that during the marriage
he acquired nonmarital assets—stock; distributions; gifts, both
monetary and nonmonetary; real property; and the like—which he
would deposit into an account in the name of 656 R/E Venture.
The Former Husband testified that he solely owned and
4
Throughout the dissolution proceeding, the Former Husband
and Arnold Rich persistently attempted to thwart discovery and
demonstrated a continued refusal to comply with discovery
obligations and orders compelling the same. The Former Husband
was found in contempt and sanctioned for his behavior on more
than one occasion, and the trial court even went so far as to
threaten incarceration should the Former Husband continue his
intentional and willful noncompliance.
12
incorporated 656 R/E Venture but insisted that the 656 R/E
Venture accounts were established to accommodate nonmarital
earnings, as contemplated by the Agreement. In any event,
according to the Former Husband, whatever nonmarital assets
might have existed have since been fully depleted as a result of the
dissolution proceedings. He explained that he was forced to take
out loans from his father in order to comply with various court
orders in the dissolution proceedings, as well as to pay for his own
attorney's fees and costs; his father then called the loans and sued
him in the above-mentioned "friendly" lawsuits.
After presiding over the three-day final hearing, the trial court
entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage wholly
disregarding the Former Wife's substantive evidence supporting her
claims of commingling and her claim that some of the interests in
the Additional Defendants were marital assets not governed by the
terms of the Agreement. The trial court found that it had already
determined that the ownership interests of the Former Husband in
the Additional Defendants were nonmarital by virtue of the plain
language of the Agreement when it granted the Renewed Motion,
13
and accordingly, how the Former Husband treated those assets
during the dissolution proceedings was not relevant.
II
We first address the order granting the Renewed Motion. We
review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Volusia
County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130
(Fla. 2000). "Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Menendez v. Palms W.
Condo. Ass'n, 736 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)). "It is the
movant's burden to prove the nonexistence of genuine issues of
material fact . . . ." Est. of Githens v. Bon Secours-Maria Manor
Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 928 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Only after the movant carries his initial burden does the burden
shift to the nonmoving party to show that there is an actual issue of
material fact that remains to be tried. McNabb v. Taylor Elevator
Corp., 203 So. 3d 184, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). The burden does
not shift to the opposing party unless and until the moving party
satisfies its initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of
material fact exists.
14
In its order granting the Renewed Motion, the trial court found
that the terms of the Agreement were unambiguous and that "any
interest which may be acquired by [the Former Husband] in his
father's companies are covered by the [Agreement] and are thus
non-marital in character." Hence, the trial court found the Former
Wife "waived any claims as to [the Former Husband's] interests in
his father's companies, as well as to any income, appreciation
and/or proceeds of any sale of such interests." However, that order
does not identify any specific companies that should be considered
"the father's companies" and does not specify any "affiliates" by
name. Importantly, neither the Renewed Motion nor the order
granting the Renewed Motion specifically addresses 656 R/E
Venture,5
much less the Former Wife's commingling claims.
5
The Former Husband's testimony was consistent with other
record evidence submitted by Arnold Rich in his amended sworn
affidavit in support of the Renewed Motion, attesting that Arnold
Rich had no interest in 656 R/E Venture prior to the "friendly"
lawsuits. Therefore, 656 R/E Venture cannot be one of the
affiliated or successor companies as contemplated by the
Agreement.
15
With regard to the additional twenty percent of stock in
Bannum and KMG acquired after the marriage, the trial court
found:
In the present context, [the Former Husband's]
acquisition of an additional interest in his father's
companies, even if by purchase, nevertheless results in
his having an interest as to which [the Former Wife] has
waived any claim. Moreover, if the capital call paid by
[the Former Husband] by accepting the ownership of
additional stock should be treated as a purchase (as
claimed by [the Former Wife]), then nevertheless the
additional stock ownership could not have been marital
property because the funds used to pay the capital call
were non-marital. See Orloff v. Orloff, 67 So. 3d 271 (Fla.
2d DCA 2011).
Based on these findings, the trial court dismissed with
prejudice all claims of the Former Wife as to the Additional
Defendants "which relate to or which are based on the Former
Husband's ownership interests at any time during the marriage in
the companies of Arnold R. Rich, or to any income, appreciation
and/or proceeds of the sales of such interests."
This was error. While Orloff stands for the proposition that
when an asset is acquired entirely with nonmarital funds, it retains
its nonmarital classification, this is not the case here. In the
instant case, the Former Husband presented no evidence to support
16
his claim that he acquired the additional twenty percent interests
by way of nonmarital funds. Cf. Orloff v. Orloff, 67 So. 3d 271, 273
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ("[T]his asset must be classified as nonmarital
because Mr. Orloff used solely nonmarital assets to form it."). There
was a dispute as to how the additional stock was acquired: the
Former Wife alleged the Former Husband purchased the stock with
marital funds, while the Former Husband maintained that the stock
was acquired by way of a capital call that he paid using nonmarital
assets. The determinative question is whether the monies the
Former Husband used, whether to purchase or to answer a capital
call, were marital in nature.
Because the record is void of any evidence supporting the
Former Husband's and the Additional Defendants' claims that the
additional shares were acquired by use of nonmarital funds—
thereby allowing the shares to retain their nonmarital character,
whether by terms of the Agreement or under section 61.075(6)(b),
Florida Statutes (2009)—the burden never shifted to the Former
Wife to introduce evidence that the shares were acquired by the use
of marital funds, namely those held by 656 R/E Venture.
17
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment as it relates to the additional twenty percent interests
where there remains a disputed issue of material fact as to whether
the additional twenty percent interests were acquired using marital
funds, thereby taking them outside the purview of the Agreement.
And so it follows that the trial court also erred in dismissing with
prejudice the Former Wife's claims against the Additional
Defendants.6
In the final judgment, the trial court compounds this
error by relying upon the order granting the Renewed Motion
to find:
13. Business Interests: One of the substantial
disputes, in this case, revolves around the valuation and
usage of the [Former] Husband's ownership interest in
various businesses listed under Tab G of the Equitable
6
The Former Wife's claims against the Additional Defendants
go beyond whether she is entitled to any portion of the Former
Husband's interests in his father's companies. The Former Wife
alleged that the Former Husband and his father conspired to
deplete the martial estate with the help of the Additional
Defendants and that as a result of such fraudulent behavior, she
may be entitled to relief from the Additional Defendants. Because
these claims exceeded the narrow relief sought in the Renewed
Motion, dismissal was improper.
18
Distribution Schedule.[7] This Court has previously
found, in its Order Granting Additional Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated December
5, 2017, that the ownership interests of the [Former]
Husband in these companies were nonmarital by virtue
of the plain language of the parties' [Agreement].
. . . .
The Court finds that the interpretation of this
provision of the parties' Antenuptial Agreement as it
relates to affiliates and successors encompasses all
corporations involved in the owning and operating of
half-way houses, which is the purpose of [Bannum]. As
such, the [Former Husband's ownership interest[s] in
these corporations were nonmarital and what he did with
his ownership interest during the pendency of this action
is immaterial for purposes of equitable distribution.
(Emphasis added.)
Because the order granting the Renewed Motion made no
determination that the Former Husband's ownership interests in
any of the specific Additional Defendants was nonmarital under the
Agreement, or to the extent the trial court did find, in its previous
order, that the Former Husband's interests in Bannum and KMG
were nonmarital, that finding as it relates to the additional twenty
7
The companies listed in Tab G of the Equitable Distribution
Schedule include: 656 R/E Venture, Inc.; Accounting, Etc., Inc.;
Bannum Place of Washington DC, Inc.; Kentucky Management
Group, Inc.; JJ Leasing of Central Florida, Inc.; Bannum of Sioux
City, Inc.; Airrich, LLC [sic]; AJ RE Venture, LLC; Bannum, Inc.;
and AJ Moderation, Inc.
19
percent interests in Bannum and KMG was improper. Accordingly,
we reverse in part the order granting partial summary judgment
and remand for the trial court to consider whether the Former
Husband acquired the additional twenty percent interests in
Bannum and KBG by use of marital funds. Moreover, because the
order granting the Renewed Motion merely finds that companies
owned by the Former Husband's father—without identifying any
specific company—constitute affiliates of Bannum, the trial court
shall, on remand, identify which companies, if any, are affiliates of
Bannum.
III
We next address the Former Wife's contentions that the trial
court erred in wholly disregarding the "dumpster documents" as
substantive evidence. We review the "trial court's characterization
of an asset as marital or nonmarital de novo" and review for
competent substantial evidence those "factual findings necessary to
make [such] legal conclusion." Dravis v. Dravis, 170 So. 3d 849,
852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); see also Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174
So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015) (holding that the plain meaning of a
20
prenuptial agreement controls when the agreement is clear and
unambiguous).
The trial court declined to consider the "dumpster documents"
as substantive evidence on the dual bases that it found (i) the
Former Wife was not credible and (ii) the circumstances of her
acquisition and the purported timing of disclosure of the "dumpster
documents" raised concerns about fairness and their "authenticity."
In the particular context of this case, these findings do not support
the trial court’s decision to disregard the documents entirely.
As a threshold matter, the trial court as the finder of fact in a
dissolution proceeding unquestionably has discretion to determine
the credibility of witnesses and to weigh their testimony
accordingly. See, e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976)
("It is clear that the function of the trial court is to evaluate and
weigh the testimony and evidence based upon its observation of the
bearing, demeanor and credibility of the witnesses appearing in the
cause."). Here, the trial court found the Former Wife to be not
credible. However, in the unique context of this case, that
credibility finding simply cannot serve as the basis to entirely
disregard the "dumpster documents" as substantive evidence.
21
Regardless of the Former Wife's credibility or the circumstances of
her acquisition of these financial documents, they were largely
created by third parties, including the Additional Defendants, and—
more importantly—neither their substantive legitimacy nor
accuracy were in dispute below. Indeed, our review of the record
shows that some of the "dumpster documents" had in fact been
admitted into evidence by the Former Husband in Phase One.
Thus, the probative value of the "dumpster documents" did not
depend in any meaningful way on the Former Wife's credibility, and
the trial court erred to the extent it wholly disregarded them on that
basis.
Nor do the court's stated concerns about the documents'
"authenticity," the circumstances of their acquisition, or the
purported timing of their disclosure warrant disregarding this
evidence entirely. As recounted in the factual findings of the final
judgment, the trial court questioned the authenticity of the
"dumpster documents" obtained by the Former Wife's questionable
measures. While the trial court may have found the method in
which the Former Wife obtained relevant financial records
questionable, the Former Husband and the Additional Defendants
22
clearly stipulated at trial to the admission of the "dumpster
documents" and waived any applicable privileges. This stipulation
was binding and resulted in the waiver of the Former Wife's
obligation to lay a foundation for admission and authentication of
these records. See, e.g., Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania, 252 So. 2d 1,
4 (Fla. 1971) ("A stipulation properly entered into and relating to a
matter upon which it is appropriate to stipulate is binding upon the
parties and upon the Court."); Jackson v. Household Fin. Corp. III,
298 So. 3d 531, 535 (Fla. 2020) (recognizing that a party can lay a
foundation for the admission of documents by obtaining a
stipulation of admissibility from the opposing party). Because the
trial court appropriately received these records into evidence, it
could not summarily disregard them without even considering their
substance. See, e.g., Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 560-61
(Fla. 2010) (recognizing the "general rule" that even "uncontroverted
factual evidence cannot simply be rejected unless it is contrary to
law, improbable, untrustworthy, unreasonable, or contradictory."
(quoting Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 390 (Fla. 1994)).
Here, the documents were admitted into evidence without
objection, and all applicable privileges were expressly waived.
23
Thus, the documents had a proper foundation, and their
authenticity was not in question. See Jackson, 298 So. 3d at 535;
Third Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n of Cleveland v. Koulouvaris, 247 So.
3d 652, 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ("Florida law requires the
authentication of a document prior to its admission into evidence."
(citing § 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2012))). Further, the Former Husband's
unqualified stipulation to admit the documents into evidence
waived any objections he may have had regarding their acquisition
or disclosure. See Heath v. Thomas Lumber Co., 140 So. 2d 865,
866 (Fla. 1962) ("Petitioner waived any objection she might have
had by her stipulation at the May 17 hearing that the depositions of
respondent be admitted in evidence.").
The documents the trial court disregarded constituted much of
the Former Wife’s substantive evidence. These "dumpster
documents" included third-party financial documents relied upon
by the Former Wife to prove her claim that some of the assets
transferred by the Former Husband to his father during the
pendency of this dissolution proceeding constituted marital
property. These "dumpster documents" also supported her claims
of commingling, which could, of course, result in this nonmarital
24
property losing its nonmarital nature. See Dravis, 170 So. 3d at
852 ("Nonmarital assets may lose their nonmarital character and
become marital assets where, as here, they have been commingled
with marital assets." (citing Abdnour v. Abdnour, 19 So. 3d 357, 364
(Fla. 2d DCA 2009))). This evidence would also support the Former
Wife's argument that 656 R/E Venture and its accounts were
marital in nature due to commingling and that the additional
twenty percent of stock in Bannum and KMG, acquired in 2006,
was acquired using marital funds.
As such, by declining to even consider the "dumpster
documents," the trial court made no independent analysis of the
Former Wife's commingling claims or claims that the Former
Husband's transfer of certain assets constituted misconduct during
the dissolution case which resulted in the dissipation of marital
assets. See Dravis, 170 So. 3d at 853 (explaining that misconduct
during the dissolution that results in the dissipation of marital
assets is the exception to the general rule that assets diminished or
dissipated during the dissolution proceedings should not be
included in the equitable distribution scheme). In the context of
25
this case, the trial court erred by declining to consider these
documents as substantive evidence.
Because these erroneous findings were integral to other
factual findings in the final judgment concerning marital assets,
equitable distribution, and child and spousal support, a new trial is
required. Cf. Orloff, 67 So. 3d at 275. On remand, the trial court
shall determine what if any allegedly nonmarital property—
including, but not limited to, the twenty percent interests in
Bannum and KMG acquired in 2006, the marital home, and any
accounts held by 656 R/E Venture—lost their nonmarital character
as a result of the commingling with marital property. See Dravis,
170 So. 3d at 852 ("Nonmarital assets may lose their nonmarital
character and become marital assets where, as here, they have
been commingled with marital assets." (citing Abdnour, 19 So. 3d at
364)). The trial court shall then equitably distribute all marital
assets. Further, based upon the evidence established at the new
trial, the trial court shall recalculate child support, determine
whether the Former Wife is entitled to any spousal support, and
reconsider the parties' motions for attorney's fees and costs. See
Orloff, 67 So. 3d at 275. Finally, the trial court shall consider
26
whether any of the Former Husband's actions taken during the
dissolution proceedings constitute misconduct that resulted in the
dissipation of marital assets.
Outcome: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
instructions
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: