Date: 06-18-2018

Case Style:

Case Number: 17-2274

Judge: Shepherd

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on appeal from the Western District of Missouri (Jackson County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: John Wray Kurtz

Defendant's Attorney: Toby Crouse, Stephen R. McAllister, Jeffrey P. Ray, Holly L. Teeter

Description: In the third iteration of this unfortunate case of mistaken identity, PlaintiffStuart Wright (“Wright”) appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment to the United States and the Deputy U.S. Marshals in their individual and official capacities on Wright’s claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”). Wright argues that the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that, as a matter of law, the Marshals were not liable to him under the FTCA for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and assault and battery. We disagree and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
I. Background
In 2008, Deputy U.S. Marshals with the U.S. Marshals Service in the District of Kansas began an investigation to locate and arrest Vinol Wilson (“Wilson”), who had been indicted by a grand jury in Kansas for conspiracy to manufacture, to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute cocaine base and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The Marshals had an arrest warrant for Wilson, and after learning that he was involved in a local Kansas City, Missouri basketball league, they planned to arrest him during one of the games. Sources told the Marshals that at 6:30 p.m. on August 15, 2009, Wilson would be playing basketball at the Grandview Community Center and that he would be wearing an orange jersey with the number 23. The Marshals also knew that Wilson was a black male body builder born in 1974. That evening around 6:45 p.m., the Marshals entered the gym in plain clothes and interrupted the game. With their weapons drawn, they approached a black male who was on the court wearing an orange jersey with the number 23 and told him to get on the ground. That man was Wright, not Wilson.

1The Honorable Sarah H. Hays, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.

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Wright did not understand the Marshals’ commands at first, and he stepped backwards away from them. One of the Marshals grabbed Wright’s shirt and kicked at his legs. Another applied his Tazer to Wright’s back. Once the Marshals subdued Wright, they asked him his name. Wright told the Marshals he was Stuart Wright,and one replied, “don’t lie to me.” The Marshals then arrested Wright, took him outside, and sat him in the back of a police patrol car. On the way to the car, a police officer told the Marshals that he knew Wright and that they had apprehended the wrong man. Wright’s brother also brought Wright’s identification to the Marshals to prove to them that he was not Wilson. The Marshals allowed Wright’s brother to speak to Wright for a few minutes while still keeping Wright in custody. They then asked Wright a few questions about Wilson. After detaining Wright for 20 minutes,the Marshals released him and warned him that he had two traffic warrants he needed to resolve.
In December 2010, Wright filed this action against the United States. The complaint included FTCA claims for (1) false arrest, (2) false imprisonment, (3)abuse of process, and (4) assault and battery. Following a series of motions and appeals,2 the FTCA claims were the only ones left before the district court. The Marshals moved for summary judgment on those claims as well. The district court,relying heavily on our findings in a previous appeal in this case that dealt withBivens3 claims, found that the United States was entitled to summary judgment oneach of Wright’s FTCA claims. Wright now appeals.
2The previous appeals include Wright v. United States, 545 Fed. Appx. 588
(8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) and Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689
(8th Cir. 2015).
3Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
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II. Discussion
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Hinsley v.Standing Rock Child Protective Servs., 516 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “We will affirm the district court if there are no genuine issues ofmaterial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
Generally, the United States is immune from suit; however, the FederalGovernment may consent to be sued, as it did with the passage of the FTCA. Id. TheFTCA provides that “[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions ofthis title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a privateindividual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The FTCA applies “to anyclaim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse ofprocess, or malicious prosecution” as a result of the “acts or omissions ofinvestigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” Id.§ 2680(h). The applicable tort law is “the law of the place where the act or omissionoccurred.” Id. § 1346(b)(1). Because this incident took place in Missouri, Missouri’stort law applies.
A. Genuine Issue of Material Fact
Wright argues the Government was required to respond to the concisestatement of material facts that he offered in response to the Government’s originalstatement of uncontroverted material facts attached to its motion for summaryjudgment. Wright asserts that Mo. D. Ct. R. W. D. 56.1(c) (“Local Rule 56”) statesthe Government “must” respond to Wright’s list of material facts. Therefore, heclaims that the district court should have deemed those facts admitted because theGovernment failed to respond. However, Wright mischaracterizes the rule. LocalRule 56.1(c) states that in response to a non-moving party’s statement of material
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facts, “[t]he party moving for summary judgment may file reply suggestions.” (emphasis added). The “must” to which Wright refers appears in the next sentence:“[i]n those suggestions, the [Government] must respond to [Wright’s] statement ofadditional facts in the manner prescribed in Rule 56.1(b)(1).” Id. The word “must”does not command a response: rather, it directs how the Government should respondto Wright’s statement of facts should it choose to do so. Therefore, the district courtwas not required to deem Wright’s list of material facts admitted simply because theGovernment did not directly respond to them.
Next, Wright argues that the district court erred in finding that he did notpresent evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Even assuming that Wright’s statement of facts should have been deemed admitted,the district court did not err in finding that Wright failed to demonstrate the existenceof a genuine issue of material fact. Wright outlines several factual contentions thathe claims contradict the district court’s factual statements and summary judgmentconclusions. However, none of these facts are inconsistent with the district court’sstatement of material facts. For example, the district court made no reference towhere Wright’s hands were located during the encounter, but Wright presents awitness affidavit stating that Wright had his hands in the air. This is the onlystatement regarding the placement of Wright’s hands, and, even if it is true, it is notmaterial because the district court already acknowledged that Wright was notengaging in any threatening behavior. Because none of Wright’s proposed factscontradict a material fact that the district court relied on in conducting its summaryjudgment analysis, we find the district court did not err.
B. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that “[t]he essence of the cause of action of false arrest, or false imprisonment, is the confinement, without legal justification,by the wrongdoer of the person wronged.” Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762,
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767 (Mo. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Celestine v. UnitedStates, 841 F.2d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). “However, justification is acomplete defense to the cause of action . . . .” Rustici, 673 S.W.2d at 767. As thedistrict court points out, on a previous appeal, we held that the Marshals had probablecause to arrest Wright. Wright, 813 F.3d at 698. In Wright, we found that underMissouri law it is a crime to resist arrest and that Wright backing away from theMarshals and not yielding to their commands was sufficient to give the Marshals“probable cause to believe that Wright had committed the crime of resisting arrest andjustify their twenty minute restraint on Wright’s liberty.” Id. Thus we have alreadydetermined that the initial arrest and detention were justified and reasonable under thecircumstances. Accordingly, in line with our prior opinion, we find the district courtdid not err in holding that both Wright’s arrest and 20-minute detention werejustified.
C. Abuse of Process
Abuse of process requires: “(1) the present defendant made an illegal,improper, perverted use of process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by theprocess; (2) the defendant had an improper purpose in exercising such illegal,perverted or improper use of process; and (3) damage resulted.” Stafford v. Muster,582 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Mo. 1979). The district court focused on the second element,finding that the Marshals did not have an improper or ulterior purpose. Wright arguesthat this was incorrect and that an ulterior purpose is not the sine qua non for an abuseof process claim.
“We may affirm the [district court’s] judgment on any basis supported by therecord.” Holt v. Howard, 806 F.3d 1129, 1132 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotationmarks omitted). Rather than focusing on the second element, our analysis hinges onthe first. As stated above, we held in Wright that both the arrest and 20-minutedetention were legally justified and reasonable. Wright, 813 F.3d at 698. Therefore,
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we have already found that the Marshals did not make “an illegal, improper, [or]perverted use of process,” and that the arrest and detention were warranted andauthorized by the process. See Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 678. Accordingly, we findthe district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Government as toWright’s abuse of process claim.
D. Assault and Battery
Under Missouri law, a law enforcement officer can be held liable for damagesfor assault and battery “only when in the performance of his duty in making the arresthe uses more force than is reasonably necessary for its accomplishment.” Neal v.Helbling, 726 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting State ex rel. Ostmannv. Hines, 128 S.W. 248, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910)). In Schoettle v. Jefferson County,we held that the officer’s use of force was insufficient to qualify as assault and batteryunder Missouri law because the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable for thepurposes of qualified immunity. Schoettle, 788 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2015). InWright, we found that the Marshals were entitled to qualified immunity because “areasonable officer would not have had fair warning that using a single Tazer shockagainst a suspected felon would have violated clearly established Constitutionalrights.” Wright, 813 F.3d at 697. Our qualified immunity holding is dispositive ofthe assault and battery claim. See Schoettle, 788 F.3d at 861.
Additionally, in Wright, we essentially engaged in a reasonableness analysiswhen we emphasized that Wilson was a felon who “was considered armed anddangerous” and had a “history of drug, weapons, and aggravated assault offenses.” Wright, 813 F.3d at 697. Those facts, combined with our earlier findings that theMarshals had probable cause to believe that Wright was resisting arrest, convincesus that the Marshals’ use of force was no more than reasonably necessary toeffectuate the arrest. See id. at 697-98. Therefore, we find that the district court
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appropriately granted the Government summary judgment on Wright’s assault andbattery claim.

Outcome: For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summaryjudgment in all respects.

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