Date: 06-08-2018

Case Style:

Case Number: 17-1812

Judge: Per Curiam

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on appeal from the District of Minnesota (Ramsey County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Katharine T Buzicky

Defendant's Attorney: Shannon R. Elkins - FPD

Description: Debrom Kokobu appeals his conviction for one count of simple assault in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) and 49 U.S.C. § 46506, arguing there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The district court1 sentenced him to
four months of incarceration, with no supervision to follow. Generally, we review
challenges to sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence “in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Calhoun, 721 F.3d 596, 599
(8th Cir. 2013). Here, because Kokobu did not move for judgment of acquittal on the
charge for which he was convicted, we review only for plain error. Id. at 600. The
testimony at trial showed that—after an initial physical altercation between Kokobu
and his girlfriend aboard a Delta Airlines flight—Kokobu roughly put his hands on
her and grabbed her jacket while she was visibly upset and crying. This conduct
formed the factual basis for the charge of simple assault.
Section 113(a) does not define the term “simple assault.” United States v.
Watts, 798 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2015). Although we typically assume, “absent
contrary indications,” that Congress intended to adopt the common law definition of
a crime, circuit precedent on this particular statute is not so clear. United States v.
Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 448 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S.
10, 13 (1994)). “We have made apparently divergent statements about whether
Congress intended to equate the term ‘simple assault’ in § 113(a)(5) with commonlaw
assault.” Id. (comparing United States v. Whitefeather, 275 F.3d 741, 743 (8th
Cir. 2002), with United States v. Yates, 304 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 2002)). We need
not resolve this issue here, however, because Kokobu expressly asserts that the jury
was “properly instructed” on the definition of assault. The district court instructed
that, “‘assault’ . . . means any intentional and voluntary attempt or threat to do injury
to another person, when coupled with the present ability to do so sufficient to put that
other person in fear of immediate bodily injury.” For purposes of this appeal, we
accept this definition. Cf. Yates, 304 F.3d at 818 (“The common law offense of
-2-
simple assault requires the showing of an offer or attempt by force or violence to do
a corporal injury to another.” (cleaned up)).
The evidence in this case satisfies this definition of assault. Drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, as we must, a jury could find that
Kokobu’s behavior, in grabbing and touching his girlfriend when she was visibly
upset, tearful, and clearly not wanting physical contact with him, communicated a
threat to do bodily injury to her. Particularly when coupled with evidence that
Kokobu had forcefully placed his arm around her neck moments earlier—even if this
evidence did not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Kokobu committed
an assault by strangulation—a reasonable jury could infer that this conduct was
intentional, voluntary, and threatening, and that Kokobu’s girlfriend was “in fear of
immediate bodily injury.” The district court did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte
grant Kokobu judgment of acquittal on this count.

Outcome: The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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Defendant's Experts:

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